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Abstract
Over the last decades, great efforts and investments have been made to increase the integration level of renewable energy resources in power grids. The New York State has
set the goal to achieve 70% renewable generations by 2030, and realize carbon neutrality
by 2040 eventually. However, the increased level of uncertainty brought about by renewables makes it more challenging to maintain stable and robust power grid operation. In
addition to renewable energy resources, the ever-increasing number of electric vehicles
and active loads have further increased the uncertainties in power systems. All these factors challenge the way the power grids are operated, and thus ask for new solutions to
maintain stable and reliable grids. To meet the emerging requirements, advanced metering
infrastructures are being integrated into power grids that transform traditional grids into
” smart grids”. One example is the widely deployed phasor measurement units (PMUs),
which enable generating time-synchronized measurements with high sampling frequency,
and pave a new path to realize real-time monitoring and control in power grids. However,the massive data generated by PMUs raises the questions of how to efficiently utilize
the obtained measurements to understand and control the present system. Additionally, to
meet the communication requirements between the advanced meters, the connectivity of
the cyber layer has become more sophisticated, and thus is exposed to more cyber-attacks
than before. Therefore, to enhance the grid reliability with PMUs, robust and efficient grid
monitoring and control methods are required.
This dissertation focuses on three important aspects of improving grid reliability with
PMUs: (1) power system event detection; (2) impact assessment regarding both steadystate and transient stability; and (3) impact mitigation. In this dissertation, a comprehensive introduction of PMUs in the wide-area monitoring system, and comparisons with the
existing supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are presented first.
Next, a data-driven event detection method is developed for efficient event detection with

PMU measurements. A text mining approach is utilized to extract event oscillation patterns and determine event types. To ensure the integrity of the received data, the developed
detection method is further designed to identify the fake events, and thus is robust against
cyber-threat. Once a real event is detected, it is critical to promptly understand the consequences of the event in both steady and dynamic states. Sometimes, a single system event,
e.g., a transmission line fault, may cause subsequent failures that lead to a cascading failure
in the grid. In the worst case, these failures can result in large-scale blackouts. To assess
the risk of an event in steady state, a probabilistic cascading failure model is developed.
With the real-time phasor measurements, the failure probability of each system component
at a specific operating condition can be predicted. In terms of the dynamic state, a failure
of a system component may cause generators to lose synchronism, which will damage the
power plant and lead to a blackout. To predict the transient stability after an event, a predictive online transient stability assessment (TSA) tool is developed in this dissertation.
With only one sample of the PMU voltage measurements, the status of the transient stability can be predicted within cycles. In addition to the impact detection and assessment,
it is also critical to identify proper mitigations to alleviate the failures. In this dissertation,
a data-driven model predictive control strategy is developed. As a parameter-based system model is vulnerable to topology errors, a data-driven model is developed to mimic the
grid behavior. Rather than utilizing the system parameters to construct the grid model, the
data-driven model only leverages the received phasor measurements to determine proper
corrective actions. Furthermore, to be robust against cyber-attacks, a check-point protocol, where past stored trustworthy data can be used to amend the attacked data, is utilized.
The overall objective of this dissertation is to efficiently utilize advanced PMUs to detect,
assess, and mitigate system failure, and help improve grid reliability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

General Introduction

As the world is stepping into the fourth industrial revolution, i.e., a cyber-physical system, electricity has become indispensable for human livelihood and manufacturing. For
electrical power engineers, ensuring a reliable supply of electricity is always the first task.
However, with the ever-increasing deployment of renewables and the expansion of the
power grids, maintaining a reliable operation of the power grids becomes challenging with
existing grid monitoring and control strategies. If a system failure cannot be detected and
mitigated promptly, severe subsequent failures may occur and, in the worst case, lead to a
large blackout and cause substantial social and economic loss. In addition to the physical
aspect of the grid, as the power grids evolve to a cyber-physical system, the threat of cyber
attacks has also increased, making the grids more vulnerable. For example, a malicious
false data injection attack can bypass existing bad data detection filters, generate false
events, lead to incorrect control actions, and jeopardize the reliability of the system [1, 2].
Facing these new challenges, it is now required to develop new tools to efficiently detect,
assess, and mitigate system failures in the presence of cyber threats and thus improve the
reliability of the grid.
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1.2

Motivation

Electricity is one of the most critical elements of our daily life. As society is chasing
efficiency in every aspect of life, continuously supplying stable electricity to consumers
becomes more important. However, the rapid growth of the deployed renewables and electric vehicles, the enlarged diversity of energy consumption, and the expansion of the power
grids have extremely stressed grid operation, and challenged the existing power grids. If
the system operating conditions are not properly monitored and controlled, severe grid
failures can occur, which can lead to large blackouts. An example of blackout due to loss
of situational awareness is the Northeast blackout of 2003, which affected both America
and Canada for seven hours [3]. A recent large blackout in Texas in 2021 has also shown
that the uncertainties introduced by wind power can lead to a large power outage and cause
$200 billion economic loss [4]. Hence, real-time situational awareness is essential for a
reliable power grid. Benefiting from the advances in the smart grid, it is now possible to
efficiently monitor and control power systems. One of these advances is the deployment of
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), which can provide system measurements, e.g. voltage and current phasors, with a sampling frequency of 120 frames per second. Given the
real-time PMU data, system operators can better understand the system conditions and
maintain a stable system.
Unfortunately, these PMU measurements are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. For example,
a man-in-the-middle attack can tamper with the PMUs, bypass bad data detection, create
fake system events, and lead to costly or even harmful control actions. For example, in
Ukraine’s grid failure event, malware is used to control substation breakers and inject
false data through different communication protocols such as IEC 61850 and IEC 608705-101 [5, 6]. Therefore, it is imperative to enhance real-time situational awareness of the
power grid, which motivates us to develop robust tools to detect, assess, and mitigate grid
failures under the threat of cyber attacks, and improve grid reliability.
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1.3

Research Scopes and Objectives

The three main topics of this dissertation are illustrated in Fig. 1.1. Given physical events,
for example, transmission line failures, and possible cyber threats, this work develops
robust tools to: 1) identify the types of events and determine the integrity of the data; 2)
assess the impact of the event in terms of both steady and dynamic states; 3) find optimal
mitigations to bring the grid back to normal operation.

Detection

Physical
Event
Cyber
threat

Stable
System

Mitigation

Assessment

Figure 1.1: The three topics of this proposal

The objectives of these three topics are described as follows:
1. Event Detection
• When an event occurs, the event detector should be able to rapidly and accurately
inform system operators of the types of system events;
• If the event is created by attackers, the event detector can efficiently distinguish
the fake events from the real events;
• To increase the applicability in different grid sizes, the developed detection tool
should be scalable and independent of the power network size;
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2. Failure assessment
• Steady State:
– Given the real-time PMU measurements, a failure model is developed to accurately and promptly predict failure propagation, i.e., sequence of the cascading failure;
– As the propagation of cascades varies with different grid operating conditions, to provide more accurate failure information, the developed failure
model should be adaptive to the changing operating conditions of the grids;
– The failure model can provide the failure probability of each system component, and help grid operators identify critical components;
• Transient State:
– The transient stability assessment tool can be used to accurately and promptly
predict the transient status after the occurrence of a system failure;
– By capturing the spatial and temporal correlations of the post-fault PMU time
series data using machine learning methods, the transient stability assessment
accuracy can be further improved.
3. Failure mitigation
• As the grid model information is threatened by cyber-attacks, a data-driven power
flow model is constructed with only past PMU measurements;
• To alleviate system failures, in particular, transmission line overloads, a datadriven model predictive method is developed;
• To be robust to the false data attack, a check-point protocol is implemented to

5
correct tampered data with stored past PMU measurements.

1.4

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
System

Conventionally, the power grids are monitored and controlled by supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA systems are defined as a collection of equipment that allow system operators to remotely acquire accurate system states and control
various components [7]. The SCADA in power grid has two main functions: (1) data
acquisition of the grid operating condition; (2) supervisory control of the system components, e.g., switches. In summary, the SCADA system has four main elements, which are
shown in Fig. 1.2 [7]:
• Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)/ Data concentrator: RTU or data concentrator is the link
between the field and control center, where field data can be measured and sent to the
control center, and command data can be passed from the control station to the field
equipment;
• Communication System: The communication system is responsible for sending the acquired data from the RTU / Data concentrator to the control center and transmitting the
command from the master station to the RTU/Data concentrator;
• Master Station: The master station is the place where operators can determine control
actions and monitor the grid states;
• Human Machine Interface (HMI): HMI is the user interface that allows the interaction
between the grid operators and the master station.
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Master Station

HMI

Power grid
Communication
Channel

RTU

Figure 1.2: Illustration of the SCADA system in power grids

1.5

PMUs in the Wide Area Monitoring System

As mentioned in the previous section, SCADA system uses the sensors to observe various types of data, e.g., the magnitude of the bus voltage and line current, and send the
measurements through the RTU to the master station. However, these measurements are
not synchronized and the refreshing rate is relatively low (updated every 2 to 4 messages
per second). With the increased deployment of PMUs at the current transformer (CT)
and potential transformer (PT), the SCADA system is now shifting towards a wide-area
monitoring system (WAMS). PMUs are electronic meters that can measure bus voltage
and line current phasors, frequency, as well as the rate of change of frequency (ROCOF).
Unlike SCADA meters, PMUs provide time-synchronized phasor measurements, with a
sampling frequency that can range from 30 to 240 messages per second. Comparisons
between SCADA and PMU are given in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Comparison between SCADA and PMU meters
Measurements

Sampling Frequency

Synchonized by GPS

(messages per second)
SCADA

Magnitude of the bus voltage,

2 to 4

Magnitude of line current

(only steady state)

Phasors of the bus voltage and line current,

30 to 240

frequency,

(both steady and dynamic

rate of change of frequency (ROCOF)

states)

PMU

N/A

Yes

An overview of the WAMS architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1.3. PMUs, deployed in CT
and PT, continuously measure the voltage and current phasors, frequency, and ROCOF.
Meanwhile, attackers can use malware to alter the measurements and send wrong information to the control center. According to the IEEE C37.118.2 standard, PMUs transmit
GPS time-stamped phasor data to their local phasor data concentrator (PDC), where the
data will be processed into streams. The output stream will be further sent to the super
PDC, and used by the control center for various applications. Here, we focus on the applications of detection, assessment, and mitigation of the event, which belong to the two
main functions of the WAMS, i.e., event analysis and wide area monitoring and control.

1.6

Contribution of Dissertation

The four chapters of this dissertation discuss the methods developed for event detection,
assessment, and mitigation. The contributions of this research are explained below.

1.6.1

Chapter 2

Dynamic visualization is essential for power system operation and control, as it enables
providing the cause of the events and facilitating the post-event decision-making process to
prevent potential cascading failures. This chapter develops an effective method for power

PT

CT

Power system
Network

PT

CT

Events

PMU

Data
Archive

Data
Archive

Super PDC

Control
Center

Wide area motoring
and control

State Estimation

Event Analysis

Event
Mitigation

Event
Assessment

Event
Detection

Figure 1.3: Illustration of improving grid resilience using PMUs in power grids
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system event identification purely based on the received multivariate PMU time series
data. For each power system event, a data processing method, i.e., Symbolic Aggregation
approXimation (SAX) method, is used to compress and convert PMU time-series data into
text words that in turn are fed into the machine learning classifier to classify the types of
events. In comparison to the conventional event classification methods, this methodology
achieves a higher classification accuracy and has the ability to identify fake transients that
are produced as a result of cyber-attacks. Furthermore, by using the substation measurement available at each local PDC, the developed event detection approach is scalable and
independent of the size of the power network.

1.6.2

Chapter 3

When a system event is detected, it is also critical to estimate the consequences of the
event and assess its impact. A small failure in the system may lead to a severe cascading
failure. Therefore, to predict the potential cascading failure sequence under specific operating conditions, in this chapter, we develop a dynamic cascading failure model that is
adaptive to changing operating conditions of the system. Bayesian framework is used to
estimate the interactions of the components of the power grid failures for a specific operating condition, resulting in a more accurate estimation of the interactions for near real-time
operations. Additionally, with the developed propagation method, the failure probability
of each system component can be predicted at each point in time, and thus operators can
help find risky components that need further protection. Compared with the DC/AC-based
cascading failure model, this dynamic interaction model can forecast impending failures
in a significantly shorter time.

1.6.3

Chapter 4

The aforementioned event assessment only looks at the steady-state conditions of the
power grids. However, post-event transient status also plays a key role in maintaining
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a stable grid, as unstable transients can lead to severe cascading failures and result in a
large economic loss. In this chapter, we develop a new data-driven transient stability assessment (TSA) tool to efficiently predict the post-fault transient status. Specifically, the
generative and adversarial networks (GAN) are used to learn the temporal correlations of
the received PMU voltage time series data to make more accurate TSA decisions. With
only one sample of the post-contingency PMU voltage data, the developed TSA can predict the evolution of the time series data, and thus determine the status of the transient at
the earliest stages after a fault.

1.6.4

Chapter 5

If for any reason a failure in the power grids causes further thermal overloads on transmission lines, it is imperative to find optimal mitigations to alleviate overloads and prevent
the propagation of cascading failures. However, it is now more challenging than ever to
make prompt and accurate mitigations, as false data attacks on the measured data, or relay
status information, may lead to incorrect estimation of the system operating condition. To
address these new challenges, in Chapter 5, a data-driven model-predictive control (MPC)
method is developed to effectively alleviate thermal overloads under false data injection.
Here, we introduce a new measurement-based power flow solution to replace the approximate model-based DC power flow. In contrast to parametric data-driven methods that
require calculating system parameters (such as Injection Shift Factor (ISF)), the developed
data-driven method is non-parametric and thus is immune to wrong system topology information. By leveraging the concept of check point protocol, if a data attack is detected,
the actual system states can be recovered from the historical trustworthy data. Hence, a
more robust mitigation method is achieved. Furthermore, to make the control methods
more suitable for online applications, two strategies are developed to simplify the control
action space while retaining feasible solutions.
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Chapter 2
Detection of Power System Events
Considering Cyber-Attacks

2.1

Introduction

This chapter concerns the identification of the types of transient events in the presence of
cyber threats. The operation and control of the power system have become more complex
with the increased levels of uncertainty associated with renewable energy resources and
the growing interconnectivity of the grids. Dynamic visualization to detect and identify
events in the power system is a step toward addressing the increase in system complexity
for real-time operation and control [8]. Benefiting from the high sampling frequency of the
PMUs, the transient events can now be captured and visualized. However, there also comes
a concern of cyber-attack in PMU measurements. A malicious attack can bypass existing
bad data detection algorithms and create fake transients that prompt system operators to
take unnecessary or even harmful control actions. Hence, it is necessary to have a fast,
accurate, and reliable power system event classification tool to recognize these types of
events, and at the same time distinguish the fake events from the real events, such that no
additional verification is needed by the operators.
This chapter introduces a methodology for power system event identification purely based
on data received from PMUs, where the data are processed and analyzed to identify the
types of transient events that have occurred within the system. For each power system
event, a multivariate time series data is extracted from temporal PMU measurements ag-
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gregated at the phasor data concentrator (PDC) to analyze time series discords, i.e., the
event oscillation patterns. Due to the promising performance in detecting time series discords and data pruning ability, the Symbolic Aggregation approXimation (SAX) method
is used to compress and convert PMU time series data into representations that are suitable
for feature extraction and pattern identification. These features and oscillation patterns are
found for each transient event, namely false data attacks, faults, line tripping, load change,
generation change, and shunt switching. Using the extracted features, machine learning mechanisms, namely the Support Vector Machine (SVM) and the Ensemble classifier
based on Bagged Trees, are used to classify these six types of events.

2.2
2.2.1

Background
Event Classification

Researchers have investigated the use of PMU data to identify events in the power systems, such as faults, line tripping, and generation loss [8–16]. Depending on how the
data is processed, the developed methods can be grouped into three categories: signal processing methods, heuristic methods, and time-series analysis methods. Traditional signal
processing techniques such as wavelet analysis, short time Fourier transform (STFT) and
Hilbert analysis are utilized to analyze the oscillation modes of PMU signals under different transient events [9–11]. However, signal processing methods require an appropriate
sampling rate and a proper length for the sample window to guarantee an acceptable event
detection performance [15]. As an alternative, a heuristic event identification method is
developed in [12] and [13] where all PMU data are enclosed into an ellipsoid, so that features such as volume and orientation can be used to identify power system disturbances.
Heuristic methods, on the other hand, require significant classification time, challenging
their application for real-time operations [14]. Instead of using all PMU data accumulated
in PDC, authors in [8] and [16] develop a time-series analysis method that utilizes data
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from a single PMU with the largest variation to promptly identify the type of transient
events. Using the time series sub-sequences called shapelets that maximally represent
PMU data [17], this time-series approach identifies disturbance patterns while enhancing
the classification accuracy. Although the aforementioned event classification techniques
are promising in terms of accuracy, the challenge of identifying fake events due to false
data attacks has not been addressed to the best of our knowledge. Hence, the credibility
of event classification methods might become questionable under certain circumstances.
This particular challenge is addressed.
The availability of PMU-generated time series data creates an opportunity to deploy classification techniques to identify false data, as evidenced by many research efforts. Most
classification techniques can be divided into two categories: shape-based methods and
structural-based methods [18]. Shape-based methods use the distance between two timeseries data points to detect similarities (or differences). Euclidean distance and Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW) are the two common shape-based techniques used to quantify similarity [19]. These methods perform well in short time series, while the results in long
time series are less promising, or require a long computation time [20]. On the contrary, structural-based methods use global features, such as sparsity or entropy, to compare
similarity between long time series instead of analyzing each point of time-series data.
A widely used structural-based method, Bag-of-Pattern (BOP), uses the sparsity of each
time series to measure similarity [21]. Nevertheless, the aforementioned shape-based and
structural-based classification methods focus on a univariate classification problem where
the correlation among time-series data is not considered. For classifying power system
events including fake transients, analyzing the correlation between different PMU time
series data is imperative since a false data attack on PMUs will cause the data to lose
correlation [22].
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2.2.2

Cyber-Attack

Cyber-attacks on power systems can be conducted for various reasons. For example, measurements can be altered or circuit breakers disabled to disrupt power grid operation or to
acquire economic benefits [23]. The authors in [24] have shown that malware is capable of
controlling substation breakers and injecting false data through different communication
protocols such as IEC 61850 and IEC 60870-5-101. A GPS spoofing attack on PMUs is
believed to be one of the most threatening cyber-attacks on smart grids where the synchronization of measurements is disrupted [25]. Authors in [26–29] show that a malicious
cyber-attack on PMUs can remain undetected and authors in [30], [22] and [31] have
shown that attackers can mimic a transient event to inject false data into a set of PMU
streams, and thus cause wrong operator actions due to incorrect event information.

2.3

Two-Phase Scheme for Classifying System Events

In this event detection study, a two-phase, data-driven event classification scheme is developed to enable fast online classification of power system transient events, as illustrated
in Fig. 2.1. In the first phase, which is carried out offline, simulated multivariate PMU
time series data under different system events train an event classifier. Specifically, features such as the oscillation patterns observed in the event data are first extracted from the
multivariate data. These features are then used by machine learning classifiers to learn
the patterns specific to each type of event. The second phase, which is carried out online, is triggered when the system signals such as voltage and frequency are beyond the
pre-defined event detection threshold. During this phase, local PDCs will record the event
data from PMUs, where the time-series data are analyzed to extract features that are specific to that event. An example of these features are the signal oscillation patterns and the
correlation between PMU data. Once the features are extracted, the event classifier trained
in the first phase can be used to determine the type of the detected event. Eventually, this
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scheme helps power system operators better understand the cause of the events once they
occur.

Offline

Event data collected
from PMUs

Multivariate PMU
data under different
system events

Feature Extraction

Training classifier

Offline-trained
classifier

Online

Identification of
system event

Figure 2.1: A two-phase data driven scheme for classifying power system events

2.4
2.4.1

PMU Event Data Processing and Feature Extraction
Overview of the Data Processing of the Event

In this section, a time series discord discovery method is developed to process PMU
data and uncover patterns specific to each event. Specifically, PMU time series data are
pruned and converted into SAX words, which in turn are used to create a multivariate BOP
(MBOP) matrix. Finally, a method, referred to as term frequency and document frequency
(TF-DF) method, is developed to highlight the oscillation patterns, and quantify the correlation between PMU measurements, using the constructed MBOP matrix. Thus, event
features can be extracted rapidly with the developed methodology.
PMU data processing and the feature extraction process are illustrated in Fig. 2.2. By
applying SAX to the labeled multivariate PMU voltage time series after defining the three
SAX parameters α, γ, and ω, PMU data is converted to a set of symbolic words. Next, a
multivariate BOP matrix MBOP is constructed where the number of the columns equals to
the number of PMU voltage time series and the size of each column is αγ . The element
MBOPi,j denotes the number of times a SAX word in row i occurs in jth PMU voltage time
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of PMU data processing and feature extraction
series. Therefore, the oscillation patterns of the PMU voltage time series are converted to
frequencies and stored in the MBOP matrix. After forming MBOP , the modified TF-DF
method converts the frequency of each SAX word to a weight. As a result, a weighted
matrix WBOP is constructed and converted to a voltage feature vector. Following the same
process as the multivariate PMU voltage data, a current feature vector can be computed and
combined with the voltage feature vector to construct the event feature vector f eventually.
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2.4.2

Symbolic Aggregation approXimation (SAX)

As PMU measurements are updated with high frequency, massive data will be generated.
For example, authors in [32] point out that 100 PMUs can generate up to 50 GB of data
per day. This volume of data poses major computational and hardware challenges for
analyzing the recorded PMU data. Due to the superior performance in dimension reduction, computation time, and lower bound ability [21], SAX is used in this study to compress PMU data, while guaranteeing the correctness of the similarity search in the reduced
space. This data reduction method enables pruning PMU data into symbolic words such
that, with proper text mining algorithms, time series discords can be rapidly identified.
Next, the fundamentals of the SAX method are described.
Given a PMU time series data T of length n and a sliding window of length ω (ω ≤ n),
SAX converts T into (n − ω + 1) number of overlapping sub-sequences by continuously
moving the window a unit distance ahead from the initial point of T. For each sub-sequence
data p, SAX first normalizes p such that its mean is zero and its standard deviation is one.
This property creates a distinct advantage for SAX over other methods that suffer from
variance scale issues for event classification problems. For instance, given a small and a
large generation trip that have similar waveforms but different variance scales, this normalization strategy enables minimizing the difference between these two variance scales
such that the impact of variance scales on pattern recognition is minimized. Next, the
normalized sub-sequence p is divided into γ number of equally-sized segments, where the
mean value of each segment is recorded. Hence, instead of using ω number of data points
to represent the sub-sequence p, p can be denoted as a set of γ number of mean values,
where γ is defined as the size of a word. The process of aggregating each mean value
to represent the sub-sequence p, known as Piecewise Approximate Aggregations (PAA),
significantly reduces the size of the data [33]. After forming a PAA representation of p,
the mean value of each segment is converted into an alphabet letter (a, b, c, etc.) by setting
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the alphabet size α and comparing the mean with a set of breakpoints that are presented in
Table 2.1 [34]. All mean values of the PAA representation that are less than the smallest
breakpoint are denoted as a, mean values that are larger or equal than the smallest breakpoint but less than the second smallest breakpoint are represented as b, etc. [34]. Therefore,
a symbolic word is constructed to represent the sub-sequence p. For instance, given α = 3
and the PAA representation of p as [0.5, 0.2, −0.5], the sub-sequence p can be represented
as a symbolic word cba. After transforming each sub-sequence into a symbolic word, a
time series T is converted into (n − ω + 1) number of words.
Table 2.1: Lookup table containing the breakpoints that divide a Gaussian distribution into
3 to 5 equal probable regions

Breakpoint

Alphabet Size (α)
3

4

5

β1

-0.43

-0.67

-0.84

β2

0.43

0

-0.25

0.67

0.25

β3
β4

0.84

Three parameters are required to convert time series into symbols: the alphabet size (α),
the size of a word produced by SAX (γ), and the length of the sliding window (ω). The
size of the alphabet is the number of different alphabet letters that are used to represent a
time series. The word size is the number of letters present in the output from the sliding
window. The length of the sliding window is the number of the points of a time series that
are to be converted. Given these three parameters and following the breakpoints presented
in Table 2.1, a set of words is created as described in the aforementioned steps to represent
a time series. For example, given a time series of length 110 in Fig. 2.3 after normalization,
one can divide this time series data into 11 equally-sized segments by setting the size of
a word γ as 10 and the sliding window ω as 110. Then, given the alphabet size α = 4,
the mean value of each segment is calculated and converted to a letter by comparing the
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mean with three breakpoints β1 = −0.67, β2 = 0 and β3 = 0.67. Thus, this time series
data can be converted into a symbolic word bcbabddcaa, reducing the data size from 110
to 10. If the size of the sliding window is changed to 109, two SAX words, bcbabdddaa
and bcbabddcaa, can be generated to represent these time series data.

SAX representation of time series data
2
d

Amplitude

d
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c

c
β2
b
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Figure 2.3: Symbolic Aggregation approXimation (α = 4, γ = 10, ω = 110, length of
Figure 1: Variations of the Frobenius norm calculated for the dynamic interacdata = tion
110)matrix for IEEE 30-bus system

2.4.3

Multivariate Bag-of-Pattern (MBOP)

Once PMU time series data is compressed and converted into SAX words, the occurrence
of each SAX word is used to find time series discords, i.e., transient event oscillation
patterns. For this purpose, a methodology referred to as MBOP, is developed. MBOP is
based on a text mining technique, i.e., Bag-of-Words (BOW) that creates feature vectors
2

from the generated SAX words.
Conventional text mining techniques such as BOW method enable converting SAX words
generated from a uni-variate PMU time series into a frequency vector, by counting the
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occurrence of each SAX word. Thereby, the oscillation patterns of univariate time-series
data can be represented as a frequency vector. BOW, inspired by information retrieval
and text mining, has been applied to uni-variate time series classification in many prior
works [18, 34, 35].
Given the size of the alphabet α, the size of the word γ and the length of the sliding
window ω, one can convert a uni-variate PMU time series T of length n into (n − ω + 1)
number of SAX words. Then a word-sequence frequency column vector of length αγ ,
where each element of this vector corresponds to a specific SAX word, can be constructed
to represent the univariate time series data. For instance, given α = 2 and γ = 2, the size
of the frequency vector is 22 = 4 and the elements from the first to the fourth row of this
vector correspond to SAX words aa, ab, ba, and bb, respectively. Each element in this
frequency vector represents the number of occurrences of the corresponding word among
all the (n − ω + 1) generated SAX words. The word-sequence frequency vector is the
BOW representation of a univariate PMU time series T. The time series in Fig. 2.3 can be
converted into 51 SAX words by setting ω to 60. The size of the alphabet is equal to three
and the size of the word is equal to two, therefore, the size of the column vector is 32 = 9.
By counting the number of times each word occurs (e.g., the word ac occurs 23 times)
among the 51 SAX words, the BOW vector, shown in Table 2.2, can be constructed as a
feature vector for this time series data.
Although BOW representation can help create feature vectors from the generated SAX
words, this method is not adequate for finding oscillation patterns of multivariate data as
the correlations between variables are not considered. To identify false data, the correlation between synchronized PMU data becomes a key identifying factor. During a transient event, all PMU measurements exhibit strong correlation. On the contrary, in a fake
transient, the correlation between measurements drops since false data attacks can only
change a subset of PMU measurements. Thus, it is necessary to develop a method that can
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Table 2.2: BOW representation of time series shown in Fig. 2.3 (length of data = 110,
α = 3, γ = 2, ω = 60)
SAX dictionary
aa
ab
ac
ba
bb
bc
ca
cb
cc

Frequency
0
0
23
0
20
0
8
0
0

discover the event patterns hidden in each individual PMU data while considering the correlation among these data. A BOP representation based on BOW has been defined in [36]
to classify multivariate physiological data by capturing the correlation of multivariate sensor time series. However, the features of each individual time series data are ignored when
constructing the BOP representation.
Contrary to the BOP representation, we develop the MBOP representation where the information from each PMU time series data and the correlation between them are retained. A
MBOP matrix MBOP = [BOWP M U1 , BOWP M U2 , ..., BOWP M Un ], which is a combination of several BOWs, as illustrated in Table 2.3, is created to represent multivariate PMU
time series data. Each row of MBOP denotes a SAX word and each column corresponds
to a PMU time series. The elements of MBOP represent the number of times a SAX word
occurs in the corresponding PMU data. Intuitively, the oscillation patterns observed in the
measured signals after an event are quantified as the frequencies of SAX words in MBOP .
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Table 2.3: MBOP representation of multivariate time series (α = 3, γ = 2)

SAX dictionary

Multivariate PMU time series

2.4.4

PMU1

PMU2

PMU3

...

PMUn

aa

0

0

0

...

1

ab

20

18

16

...

17

ac

15

16

17

...

18

...

...

...

...

...

...

cc

0

0

2

...

0

Term frequency and document frequency method

The MBOP representation enables transferring multivariate PMU time series data into a
frequency matrix using SAX such that the event features, e.g. oscillation patterns and correlation between PMUs, can be further extracted. However, the distinct patterns for each
event and the data correlation are not readily available through the MBOP matrix. In order
to uncover these patterns that are hidden in the MBOP matrix and quantify the correlation between the measurements, a modified TF-DF method is developed. Specifically, TF
identifies the oscillation patterns of PMU data while DF quantifies the correlation between
PMU data. Traditional term frequency and inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) method
is a weighting approach for evaluating the significance of a word in a document, and is
deployed in [18] to classify univariate time series in a way that words unique to a time
series are highlighted. In the context of this chapter, for a SAX word t, TF quantifies the
number of times t occurs in a PMU time series while IDF represents the inverse fraction of
the number of PMUs containing the word t. Contrary to the TF-IDF method, the TF-DF
method aims to recognize the hidden patterns for each event signals that most PMU measurements record as these measurements are highly correlated during a real transient event
(except during a fake transient). For a fake transient event, as the PMU measurements are
less correlated, the decreased degree of correlation among PMU data can be captured by
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TF-DF technique to detect false data.
Term frequency and inverse document frequency are calculated as follows [18],

tft,d =




1 + log(ft,d ),

if ft,d > 0



0,

otherwise

idft,D = log

(2.1)

N
N
= log
|{d ∈ D : t ∈ d}|
dft

(2.2)

where t is a SAX word extracted from a PMU time series, d is a PMU time series, ft,d is
the number of times t occurs within the SAX words generated from the PMU time series
d, D represents a set of PMU time series data, N is the total number of PMUs in D, and
dft is the number of PMU time series that contain the SAX word t. It can be observed in
(2.1) and (2.2) that the weight tft,d would be increased if the number of occurrences ft,d
increases in the PMU time series d, and the weight idft,D would be increased if the rarity
of the SAX word t, i.e.

N
,
dft

in all PMU time series data D increases.

In the TF-IDF method, IDF assigns higher weights to unique words as those are more
informative than frequent words. On the contrary, the event classification problem in this
study assigns higher importance (weights) to the common words among PMU time series
as these data are strongly correlated. Hence, a scaled document frequency (DF), counting
the number of PMU time series data containing word t, is defined as,

dft,D = exp(

dft
|{d ∈ D : t ∈ d}|
− 1) = exp(
− 1)
N
N

(2.3)

It can be observed in (2.3) that the weight of t would be higher if more PMU time series
data contain the SAX word t, and can be equal to one if t occurs in all PMU data.
The TF-DF weight of t in a PMU time series d is the product of two factors: term frequency
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and document frequency,

dft
− 1)
tf × df = 1 + log(ft,d ) × exp(
N

(2.4)

The weight of t with respect to TF-DF increases with the number of ft,d occurrences in
PMU data d, as well as the number of PMUs dft containing the SAX word t. Hence,
the TF-DF method efficiently identifies oscillation patterns of a multivariate PMU data by
assigning higher weights to the words that can represent most PMU time series. After
transferring each PMU time series into a set of SAX words, TF counts the number of
times a SAX word appears in the corresponding PMU time series. DF counts the number
of PMU time series that contain a SAX word. It converts the frequency matrix obtained
from MBOP into a weighted matrix such that the word that represents most of the PMUs
within a multivariate PMU time series is assigned a higher weight, while a lower weight
is assigned to a word unique to a single PMU data. Once the TF-DF weighted matrix is
constructed, features can be extracted to facilitate the classification. Given a MBOP matrix
in Fig. 2.4, the TF-DF weighted matrix can be constructed based on (2.4). For example,
the words ca and cb have the same number of occurrences in the first PMU time series.
However, the TF-DF method assigns a higher weight to ca than cb due to the fact that ca
occurs in data from both PMUs while cb only appears in the first PMU data.

2.4.5

Feature Extraction for Power System Events

Given a TF-DF matrix WBOP obtained from a multivariate PMU voltage time series data,
a column vector can be extracted from the weighted matrix WBOP , where the element of
the vector is the mean of the corresponding row of WBOP , which is given as,
Pn
fWBOP ,i =

j=1

WBOPi,j
n

(2.5)

MBOP matrix of a PMU
multivariate time series
PMU time PMU time
series 1
series 2
aa
1
0
ab
0
1
ac
0
1
ba
20
19
bb
17
18
bc
2
1
ca
1
2
cb
1
0
cc
0
0

TF-DF matrix of a PMU
multivariate time series
PMU time PMU time
series 1
series 2
aa
0.6065
0
ab
0
0.6065
ac
0
0.6065
ba
2.3010
2.2788
bb
2.2304
2.2553
bc
1.3010
1
ca
1
1.3010
cb
0.6065
0
cc
0
0

SAX dictionary

SAX dictionary
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Figure 2.4: Converting MBOP frequency matrix into a TF-DF weighted matrix
where fWBOP ,i is the ith element of the column vector, and n is the total number of the
columns in the weighted matrix WBOP . Authors in [34] point out that data from different
clusters have different sparsity levels in the BOP matrix. Therefore, in addition to the
mean vector fWBOP , the sparsity level of the SAX word in MBOP matrix is also extracted
as a feature. In this work, a cluster represents an event of the power system. Thus, the
sparsity level vector fs of the WBOP matrix, which is given in (2.6), is combined with the
mean vector fWBOP to construct a voltage feature vector fvoltage .

fSi =

WBOPi
n

0

(2.6)

fvoltage,i = fSi × fWBOP ,i
where fSi is the ith element of the sparsity level vector, WBOPi

(2.7)

0

is the number of nonze-

ros in the ith row of the weighted matrix WBOP , n is the total number of columns in the
WBOP and fvoltage,i is the ith element of the voltage feature vector. The PMU current feature vector can be extracted from the labeled multivariate PMU current time series data
following the same feature extraction process. Finally, the labeled hybrid multivariate
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PMU time series feature vector, f

T

=

h

T
fcurrent

,

T
fvoltage

i

, is constructed by combining

the voltage feature vector fvoltage and the current feature vector fcurrent .

2.5
2.5.1

False Data Attack Model
Modelling of the False Data Attack

Power systems are designed based on the well-established N −1 criterion and are equipped
with protection mechanisms to withstand and detect the aforementioned attacks. Bad data
detection in energy management systems (EMS) is one example of such detection schemes
that is intended to identify data anomalies that exist due to various reasons. In order
to bypass a bad data detection scheme, an attacker has to launch a coordinated attack
where multiple parts of a system have to be compromised in the cyber or physical layers.
Various coordinated attack strategies have been developed in [37], such as coordinated
physical attacks against lines and coordinated cyber attacks against substations. In this
chapter, a coordinated attack strategy is adopted and illustrated in Fig. 2.5 , in which both
PMU measurements and the relay signal are tampered by the attackers. The aim of the
attackers is to misinform the operators, to think an actual contingency has occurred in
power systems, where in reality that contingency does not exist, hence cannot be detected
by a protection relay. For instance, in order to successfully inject a coordinated attack
to mimic a real scenario of a line fault, the compromised PMU time series data has to
be similar to real power system line fault event data. A state estimator that estimates
system states, such as voltage magnitude and angle, is equipped with bad data detection
schemes to filter out bad data. Hence, for a successful attack, it has to bypass the bad
data detector to remain undetected. In order for the bad data detector to not eliminate the
false data, the state estimation residue resulting from falsified data should be smaller than
the state estimation threshold. In addition to the attack on PMUs, it is also assumed that
the attackers send fabricated relay signals to the control center, to conduct a coordinated
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attack. This is due to the fact that in an actual line fault event, the relay will send a trip
signal to the control center. In order to mimic the real fault, attackers have to comprise the
relay to send fabricated line tripping signals to the control center. With this coordinated
attack strategy, attackers can prompt the operator to take wrong actions which jeopardize
system reliability. Since it is difficult to compromise all PMUs, it is assumed that the
attacker can only gain access to a limited number of PMUs.
Transient
events
Fabricated Line
tripping command

Attack
CT
PMU

Data
Archive

Proposed
Model

PT

Power system
Network

Super PDC
Local Phasor Data
Concentrator
(PDC)
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PT

Event Analysis

Local Phasor Data
Concentrator
(PDC)

Data
Archive

Proposed
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Control
Center

State Estimation

Wide area motoring
and control

Figure 2.5: Architecture of the data-driven model in power systems

2.5.2

False Data Creation

Three data spoofing strategies, namely data drop attack, playback attack, and time attack
are used to simulate false data attacks. Data spoofing is an attack strategy where the
spoofed data becomes similar to a normal data, which makes detecting cyber-attacks a
challenging task [30]. Data drop attacks directly alter data values to falsify data. During
a playback attack strategy, attackers can use a historical PMU data to replay a transient
event [22]. In a time attack strategy, the post-event PMU data is re-sampled at a different
sampling rate [31]. Once PMU communication network is compromised by the attackers,
these three data spoofing methods can be used to alter time series data sampled by PMUs.
In this chapter, it is assumed that the data drop attack randomly alters the magnitude of the

30
data from 10% to 40%, while the playback attack mimics a fault transient to replace the
original data to misinform the operators. In a time attack, it is assumed that attackers alter
the sampling frequency of the fault transients. The re-sample rate of the time attack ranges
from a factor of 1.5 to 3, slower than the actual sampling rate of PMUs. Fig. 2.6 illustrates
an example of the three types of data spoofing strategies where seven bus voltages and 28
current magnitudes are plotted. The length of the voltage and current waveforms are 1.5s,
i.e. 90 data points to match PMU sampling rate of 60 frames per second. It can be seen
that several voltage and current measurements are directly altered in a data drop attack,
while in a playback attack, a fake transient event signal is injected to replace real PMU
data. In a time attack, the post-event voltage and current measurements appear stretched
because the sampling frequency is changed by the attacker.
Data drop attack

Data Drop Attack
current pu

voltage pu

1.1
1
0.9
0.8
20

40

60

0.3
0.2
0.1
0

80

20

PMU data points
Playback Attack

1
0.5
20

40

60

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

80

20

40

60

80

PMU data points
Time Attack
6

current pu

1.2

voltage pu

80

0.8

PMU data points
Time attack
1
0.8
0.6

60

1

current pu

voltage pu

1.5

0

40

PMU data points
Playback Attack

20

40

60

PMU data points

80

4
2
0

20

40

60

80

PMU data points

Figure 2.6: Voltage and current waveforms for three types of data spoofing attacks
Figure 1: Variations of the Frobenius norm calculated for the dynamic interaction matrix for IEEE 30-bus system
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2.6
2.6.1

Simulation Results
PMU placement

Although the number of PMU installations in power systems has increased in recent years,
existing power systems do not possess PMUs in every single location. Therefore, to study
a practical power system, it is assumed that the studied power system is observed by both
PMU and SCADA measurements and no measurement redundancies exist. The placement
of PMUs in IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems are given in Table 4.1 following the
placement algorithm introduced in [38] that guarantees power systems are fully observable
with the available measurements.
Table 2.4: PMU placement of IEEE 30-bus system and IEEE 118-bus system
Test System

PMU placement

IEEE 30-bus system

2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 15, 27
5, 12, 15, 17, 32, 37, 49, 56,

IEEE 118-bus system

59, 67, 69, 70, 71, 77, 80, 85,
92, 96, 100, 105

As the size of IEEE 30-bus system is small, it is assumed that only one PDC is used to
aggregate seven PMU voltage and current data. In the IEEE 118-bus system, the power
grid is divided into four zones that are given in Fig. 2.7, where each zone has one PDC
that gathers 26 PMU time series data from each local area.

2.6.2

Event Data Generation

When the continuously recorded PMU data, i.e., voltage, frequency or rate of change of
frequency, exceeds a pre-defined disturbance detection threshold, the disturbance data will
be archived in a separate location in PDC for post-event analysis [8]. North American
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Zone 2

Zone 1

Zone 3

Zone 4

Figure 2.7: Four zones for IEEE 118-bus system
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has defined the threshold for detecting transient
events and has set a requirement of the archived disturbance data to have at least 30 cycles
including at least 2 cycles before any event [39]. Therefore, the archived PMU voltage and
current disturbance data for the duration of 1.5 s (0.5 s of pre-event and 1 s of post-event
data) are used to classify transient events and false data. To evaluate the efficiency of the
PMU-based data-driven approach, fake transients due to false data attacks and five types
of real transient events, namely, faults, generation change, line tripping, load change, and
shunt switching are investigated under four different scenarios:
1. System with peak loading condition;
2. System with light loading condition;
3. System with light loading condition and one generator out of service; and
4. System with light loading condition and one line outage.
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False data is generated based on the aforementioned data spoofing strategies. Three-phase
balanced fault, single line to ground fault (on phase A) and double line to ground fault (on
phase A and B) are simulated on each transmission line, at a random selected distance to
one side of the line. All three types of faults are cleared after 5 cycles to simulate a real
fault clearing mechanism. It is to be noted that this study uses phase A voltage and current
data to evaluate the proposed approach. If a single line to ground fault or double line to
ground fault occurs on other phases, that is, phase B and phase C, the developed approach
that utilizes voltage and current data from the other phases can still correctly classify the
event. This is due to the fact that faults that occur at different phases exhibit similar
oscillation patterns in voltage and current data. A random generation and load change
are simulated between 10% to 40% of their nominal values. Line tripping is simulated
on each transmission line to mimic a scheduled maintenance. Shunt switching is also
simulated to mimic a switched shunt control. All transient events are simulated in TSAT,
a power system transient stability simulation software [40].
The number of each simulated power system event is given in Table 2.5. An example of
voltage and current waveforms in the vicinity of the five types of real transient events are
given in Fig. 2.8. The length of each waveform is 1.5 s, i.e. 90 points. It is worth noting
that, for each event, the shape of the voltage and current waveforms at different locations
resemble each other while the variations are different. For each event, all PMU bus voltage
and branch current data are used to construct the MBOP voltage and current matrices, and
are further processed and converted to weighted matrices using the TF-DF algorithm.
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Table 2.5: Number of studied events

voltage(pu)

Fault
Generation change
Line tripling
Load change
Shunt switching
False data
Total

Fault
1.1
1.05
1
0.95
0.9

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

current(pu)

Number of Events
IEEE 30-bus system
IEEE 118-bus system
964
1480
161
360
163
680
504
728
120
224
600
1200
2512
4672

Event Type

Fault
0.1
8 · 10−2
6 · 10−2
4 · 10−2
2 · 10−2
0

10

20

Generation change
1.02
1.02
1.02

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

current(pu)

voltage(pu)

20

10

20

10

20

40

50

60

70

80

90

current(pu)

30

90

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

70

80

90

80

90

Line trippling
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
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data points

data points

Shunt switching

Shunt switching
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60

data points
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80

current(pu)

voltage(pu)
voltage(pu)

1.03
1.03
1.03
1.02
1.02
1.02

20

80

data points

Line tripping

10

70

Load change
0.82
0.81
0.8
0.79
0.78

data points
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

60

data points

Load change

10

50

Generation change
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1

data points
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.98

40

data points
current(pu)

voltage(pu)

data points

30

90

0.1
0.1
0.1
9.8 · 10−2
9.6 · 10−2
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2.6.3

Model evaluation

After extracting features from the labeled multivariate PMU time series data, SVM and
Ensemble classifiers using Bagged Trees are used to recognize the aforementioned six
types of events. For the IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems, the size of the multivariate time series data for each local zone is 35 (28 current magnitudes and 7 voltage
magnitudes), and 26 (21 current magnitudes and 5 voltage magnitudes), respectively. Both
voltage and current data are used to classify faults, generation change, load change, line
tripping, shunt switching, and false data attacks. Since a local PDC gathers measurements from a limited number of PMUs in a zone, the proposed approach can be utilized
to classify events in a substation level and is independent of the size of a power network.
Therefore, the proposed approach can be readily applied to larger systems.
The impact of SAX parameters on the classification accuracy is investigated by varying
the size of the alphabet α, word γ, and the length of the sliding window ω. The classification accuracy, which distinguishes fault, generation loss, line tripping, load change,
shunt switching, and fake transients caused by false data attacks, is evaluated after feeding
the feature vectors into the aforementioned classifiers. Classification accuracies for IEEE
30-bus system under different combinations of SAX parameters are given in Fig. 2.9. The
cross-validation number that is used to split data into training and validation sets, is selected as 10, which is common among data mining techniques [41]. The classification
results presented in Fig. 2.9 show that the developed PMU-based data-driven approach
performs well when classifying the studied six types of events. The proposed method
achieves 99.7% accuracy on this 1.5s data when the alphabet size is 3, size of the word is
4, and the length of the sliding window is 60.
The classification confusion matrix given in Fig. 2.10 shows that all generation change,
line tripping, and shunt switching are correctly classified. One percent of misclassification
between false data attacks and faults is due to the similarity in voltage and current streams
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Figure 2.9: Average classification accuracy (in percent) of six events for different SAX
parameters for IEEE 30-bus system
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between faults and time attacks, when the re-sampling rate of time attack is close to real
sampling rate of PMUs. One percent of load change events are misclassified as generation changes, due to similarity between transient signals for large load fluctuations and
generation changes.

Figure 2.10: Confusion matrix for the developed classification method for the IEEE 30bus system (accuracy = 99.7%, α = 3, γ = 4, ω = 60)

2.7
2.7.1

Discussion
Impact of Model Parameters

Further analysis of the impact of SAX parameters , i.e. α, γ and ω, on the classification
performance in Fig. 2.9 shows that increasing α would slightly increase the classification
accuracy. For instance, given γ = 3, ω = 30 and the SVM classifier, increasing α from
three to five could improve the classification accuracy from 98% to 99.2% for clean data
and 94.2% to 96% for noisy data, respectively. It is also seen that larger γ leads to a higher
classification accuracy. Given the same ω and α, increasing γ from three to four can
enhance the classification accuracy by 2%. Increasing the length of the sliding window,
ω, can improve the classification accuracy on noisy PMU data. For example, given α = 3,
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γ = 3 and using the SVM classifier, the classification accuracy changes from 94.2% to
97.5% for noisy data when changing ω from 30 to 70. However, for clean data, increasing
ω could slightly decrease the performance of the developed data-driven model, especially
when ω is larger than 40 and α is larger than three. It can be seen in Fig. 2.9 that the
classification results drop from 99.3% to 98.1% when ω changes from 40 to 70 and α = 5,
γ = 3 and the classifier is SVM.
The classification results in Fig. 2.9 show that increasing α and γ leads to an improvement
in accuracy. However, there is a trade-off between the size of the feature vector and the
size of α and γ. Large α and γ will generate a large feature vector and thus lead to a
longer computation time for classification. This is not desired for dynamic visualization
applications, where the time it takes to classify events should be minimized. Comparing
the accuracy and the size of the feature vector, a combination where the α = 3, γ = 4,
and ω = 60 is chosen for classifying events. With this choice, the classification accuracy reaches 99.7% for clean data. It is observed that Bagged Trees Ensemble classifier
achieves a higher classification accuracy than SVM by comparing the classification accuracies for both clean and noisy data in Fig. 2.9. For the IEEE 118-bus system, with Bagged
Trees Ensemble classifier and the suggested SAX parameters, the classification accuracy
reaches 97.2% and 96.1% for clean and noisy data, respectively. The confusion matrix for
the IEEE 118-bus system for clean data is given in Fig. 2.11. It can be observed that nearly
99% of false data, 97% of faults, 98% of generation change, and 98% of load change are
correctly classified. The misclassification between line tripping and shunt switching can
be explained by the fact that these two events both belong to network operations [40].
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Figure 2.11: Confusion matrix for the developed classification method for the IEEE 118bus system (accuracy = 97.2%, α = 3, γ = 4, ω = 60)

2.7.2

Impact of the Coverage and Placement of PMUs

To evaluate the effectiveness of the developed methodology under different number of
PMUs, sensitivity studies, varying the number of PMUs as well as their location, are
also performed. The results of this study on the IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems
are presented in Table 2.6. These results show that the developed data-driven approach
achieves a high classification accuracy with different coverage rates of PMUs, although the
classification accuracy is slightly decreased with fewer number of PMUs. It is also found
that different placements of PMUs do not have a significant impact on the classification
accuracy of the developed approach.
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Table 2.6: Classification accuracy under different coverage and different placement of
PMUs (α = 3, γ = 4, ω = 60)
Different coverage of PMUs
System

Strategy

Classification

Different placement of PMUs
Strategy

accuracy (%)

2.7.3

Classification
accuracy (%)

IEEE

5 PMUs

99

5 PMUs

99

30-bus

6 PMUs

99.3

5 PMUs

98.2

system

7 PMUs

99.7

5 PMUs

98.4

IEEE

12 PMUs

95.4

12 PMUs

95.4

118-bus

16 PMUs

95.8

12 PMUs

95.1

system

20 PMUs

97.2

12 PMUs

95

Robustness to Noisy Measurements

The amount of noise present in the PMU field data decreases the event classification accuracy. Thereby, it is important to either eliminate the noise or guarantee robustness of
classification methods to noise. As indicated in [8], it is hard to filter out noise due to
similarity between noise and power system fluctuations such as load change. This emphasizes the necessity to investigate robustness of the proposed data-driven approach against
noise. Xie et al. in [42] propose adding a noise with around 92 dB signal to noise ratio
(SNR) to the simulated PMU data so that the combined data resembles a field PMU data.
As a result, a white Gaussian noise with 90 dB SNR is injected to all studied event data,
for both test systems. The proposed method achieves a 98.2% and 96.1% classification
accuracy with the previously suggested SAX parameters for IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118bus systems, respectively. Intuitively, the mean value computed from each sub-sequence
reduces the sensitivity to white Gaussian noise in the SAX method.
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2.7.4

Performance with Untrained False data

Since the work presented in this chapter is based on a supervised machine learning algorithm, for the unlabeled attack scenario, the classification accuracy might be decreased.
In order to demonstrate the performance of the developed data-driven model when the
adversary uses an attack not considered during the training, a different playback attack
strategy from that used in the offline training phase is also considered. This new playback
attack strategy mimics the transients that occur after a load change in a power system, as
illustrated in Fig. 2.12. With the offline-trained data-driven model, a total number of 500
attack events obtained from this new attack strategy is utilized to evaluate the developed
model. The data-driven model successfully identifies all 500 fake events for both the IEEE
30-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems when the data is clean. For the noisy PMU data, the
developed model successfully classifies 488 attack events as fake events for IEEE 30-bus
system, and all 500 fake events for the IEEE 118-bus system. Comparing the correlation
between the multivariate PMU data of the attack events with that of the real events, helps
explain the resulting high classification accuracy for unlabeled scenarios. This comparison
shows a low correlation between the multivariate PMU data during attacks, as compared
to a real event. This low correlation is due to the fact that the attackers can only alter a limited number of PMUs. These results corroborate the fact that considering the correlations
among PMU data is the key to more accurate identification of system events.
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Figure 2.12: An attack strategy not considered during the training

2.7.5

Comparison with Conventional Event Classification Methods

Classification accuracies of the traditional pattern recognition methods such as Discrete
Wavelet Transform (DWT), Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and more recent methods such as Domain Specific Shapelet (Dshapelet) and Slope of Dshapelet (S 3 ), are compared with the developed multivariate BOP method. DWT uses the mother wavelet, which
is a set of basic functions decomposing the data into multiple components, to transform
the time series data into several resolution levels [43]. The coefficients, which represent
the detailed and approximate information of the data, can be used as features for pattern
recognition [43]. By comparing the three widely used wavelets, i.e. Daubechies wavelet,
Least Asymmetric wavelet and Coiflets wavelet [43] for classifying transient events, the
mother wavelet Daubechies is selected for DWT method, as this wavelet reaches better
classification accuracy among all. All approximate and detailed coefficients from DWT
are selected to differentiate each event. PCA projects the data onto the principal subspace, which is a lower dimensional linear space, such that the variance of the data is
maximized [44]. The dynamics of the data can be analyzed by transferring the data into
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a combination of Principal Components (PCs) [16]. Time series can be expressed to a
set of PCs where the first PC represents the largest variance of the data. In this study,
by comparing the classification accuracy after using different number of PCs, the 15 top
largest PCs are selected as features to distinguish each event. Shapelet is the subsequence
of a time series that can maximally represent a time series [17]. Authors in [8] and [16]
utilize Dshapelet and S 3 to extract the shapelet of the time series data and the one-step
slope sequence of the shapelet as the feature vector. Dshapelet identifies a unique shapelet
that can represent the most dramatic change while S 3 captures the trend of the most dramatic change [8, 16]. Ensemble classifier based on Bagged Trees is used to compare these
traditional methods using clean and simulated field data. Classification accuracies given
in Fig. 2.13 indicate that the developed data-driven approach leads to a better accuracy
when classifying the aforementioned six types of events, and is more robust against noise.
Feature extraction time for PCA, DWT, Dshapelet, S 3 and multivariate BOP methods are
0.009s, 0.005s, 0.0015s, 0.002s and 0.026s respectively, on a computer with i7-7700 CPU,
4.2GHz core and 32GB RAM. In sum, the run-time for the second phase of the event classification in Fig. 2.1, which occurs online, is approximately 1.654s. This includes 1.5s for
event data collection, 0.026s for feature extraction, 0.028s for classification, and 0.1s for
communication delays [8], which is a reasonable time for near real-time applications.

Figure 2.13: Classification accuracy for both clean and noisy data
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2.8

Conclusions

False data attacks on PMUs pose major threats to the PMU-based dynamic visualization
tools, as counterfeit events might lead to wrong identifications of system events, which in
turn prompt ineffective actions that may compromise system reliability. It is thus crucial
to guarantee the credibility of the dynamic information obtained from the visualization
tools. This chapter introduced a new data-driven approach for classification of transient
events in power systems, that is based on data received from PMUs. The key distinction
between this method and the existing state-of-the-art is the ability to distinguish falsedata attacks from the other transient events. Three different types of false data attacks,
namely, data drop attack, playback attack, and time attack are considered to evaluate the
effectiveness of the developed approach. Power system event oscillation patterns from a
large volume of data are extracted using an efficient SAX-based methodology, while event
classification is carried out using an effective machine learning classifier, i.e. Bagged
Trees Ensemble classifier. Case studies show that the data-driven approach is superior to
the other classical methods in classifying fake transients caused by false data attacks and
real transient events, in terms of classification accuracy and robustness against noise. The
promising performance of the developed method on this 1.5s time series data in classifying
six different types of power system events makes it possible to provide fast, accurate and
reliable dynamic information to system operators to facilitate post-event decision-making
process and prevent potential cascading failures. Additionally, as the developed datadriven approach is applied at regional PDCs installed at each substation, the developed
event classification approach can be utilized in large power systems where thousands of
PMUs are deployed.
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Chapter 3
Impact Prediction of Power System
Events in Steady State

3.1

Introduction

When a system event, such as bus and line faults, occurs, some system components may
be failed, that in turn will cause further system failures. This phenomenon is the cascading
failure, where the failure of one or more components leads to the failure of others and
so on. The objective of this chapter is to predict the possible propagation of cascades,
and inform system operators of the critical system components. Furthermore, as the unprecedented increase in power system uncertainties, due to factors such as increased penetration of renewables and load uncertainties, makes real-time power system conditions
less predictable, a dynamic cascading failure prediction model, that is adaptive to different
operating conditions, is developed to predict the most probable cascade sequence.
The developed model enables fast estimation of the interactions between system components given present power flows. Concretely, the model first extracts failure propagation
patterns from a large-scale simulated cascade data under different grid operating conditions. Next, specific interactions that correspond to the present transmission line power
flows can be generated that in turn can be used to forecast potential subsequent failures in
cascades under up-to-date conditions. Having the knowledge of the potential failures, operators could block the corresponding relays [45], i.e., stop tripping of the components and
still keep these components in service in power systems, to buy time to identify appropriate
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mitigative actions and prevent or reduce the impact of cascades.

3.2

Background

The concept of developing a cascading failure model has been given significant attention
in the power engineering research, and a variety of cascading failure models have been
developed. Examples include the ORNL-PSerc-Alaska (OPA) model [46–48], Manchester model [49], Hidden failure model [50], topology-based model [51–55], CASCADE
model [56] and the branching process model [57] to simulate and analyze the impact of
cascading failures on power systems. The developed failure models can be grouped into
three different categories: (1) topology-based [51–55], (2) DC/AC-based [46–50, 58–60],
and (3) statistical models [56, 57]. Topology-based models, motivated by the complex
network methods [61–63], represent power systems as a large-scale network in which failures spread from a node to its neighbors. With a proper network representation, various
methods such as centrality measures (e.g., betweenness) can be used to assess a system’s
vulnerability to various failures. What limits the application of topology-based methods is
the fact that a cascading failure is only treated as a local phenomenon, i.e., loss of a node
only affects the neighboring nodes. However, in a real power system, cascading outages
propagate globally [64]: a failure of one component can cause another failure in a distant
location. Additionally, it is demonstrated in [65] that these topological cascading failure models could lead to erroneous conclusions regarding vulnerable system components,
which may result in wrong mitigation strategies. DC/AC-based models such as the OPA
model and the Manchester model address this issue by modeling failures with a power
law distribution. Based on the DC/AC power flow, the propagation of cascades can be
simulated to gain insights into the physics of cascade propagation in the power grids [66].
Hence, the information of cascading outages at each point in time (such as power flows
and load losses) can be used to understand the propagation and impacts of cascades [60].
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These models, however, are computationally expensive and generate large-scale data [66].
Statistical models, such as the CASCADE model and Branching process model, enable
fast generation of cascade data, but neglect power system information such as topology,
power flows and power injections [56,57]. While these models reveal the cascade size, the
contribution of each component to a cascading failure, a necessary information for online
operations, e.g., generation ramping, cannot be derived. To address the drawbacks of the
statistical models, data-driven statistical models such as the influence graph model [66,67]
and the interaction model [68–70] are developed to simulate cascading failures using the
interactions among system components. An interaction is defined as the probability of one
component’s failure, given the failure of other components. This failure probability can be
estimated from historical cascading failure data or data generated from the DC/AC-based
models. These interaction and influence graph method, however, do not predict potential
failures in near real-time. Recent studies have used learning-based method to efficiently
analyze cascading failures. Authors in [71] propose to apply reinforcement learning to
efficiently identify critical fault chains. In another study [58], Artificial neural network
(ANN) is used to promptly estimate Energy-Not-Supplied in real time. However, the failure probability of each system component, an important important information for system
protection, cannot be derived.

3.3

AC-based Cascading Failure Model

The IEEE Power and Energy Society Cascading Failure Working Group (CFWG) has
defined a cascading failure as a sequence of dependent component failures in which the
failure of one or more component leads to the failure of others, continuing with further
subsequent failures [72]. An example of the cascade data is shown in Fig. 3.1, where
the initial event in generation 1 produces two subsequent failures (i.e., two children) in
generation 2. The failure of these two components (lines 4 and 5) causes line 2 to fail in
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generation 3 due to overloads. As no more components are outaged after the outage of
line 2, this cascade stops after three generations.
No more failures:
Cascade stops

Initial Failure

Generation 1
{line 1}

Generation 2
{line 4, line 5}

Generation 3
{line 2}

Generation 4
{}

Figure 3.1: Example of a cascade propagation

As the cascading failure events in practical is rare and confidential, it is hard to have
sufficient cascade data for analysis. Hence, to generate cascade data, a simulation based
model, i.e., AC OPA model is used. This model has been previously validated in [48,
73]. AC OPA model uses AC optimal power flow (AC OPF) to solve the power flow and
determine the operator actions such as load shedding. The detailed steps followed for the
AC OPA model used in this chapter are as follows:
Step 1

Each load is initialized by multiplying a random number that is uniformly distributed in [2 − γ, γ, ] to the nominal value of the load, where γ is the load variability and is set to 1.67. Notice that all loads vary asynchronously in this study.
The choice for the load variability γ is inspired by [68, 69] to represent load variations throughout a year. The load and generation profiles of the two test systems
can be obtained from [74] and [75];

Step 2

Line power flows are initialized using AC OPF. If AC OPF diverges, loads are shed
until a solution is reached. If no solutions are obtained, back to step 1;

Step 3

An initial event is set. It is assumed that each system component fails independently
with a failure probability of 0.001, as the initial events are rare in practice. Notice
that the initial failure probability can be further improved by analyzing the historical
failure data;
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Step 4

All the islands within the system are identified. For each island, the supply and
demand are balanced by ramping up/down generation or shedding load. After the
generation and load in all islands are re-balanced, the AC OPF is calculated. If AC
OPF diverges, loads are shed until a solution is reached;

Step 5

If any line flows violate their limits, the overloaded lines are tripped and Step 4 is
repeated; otherwise, the simulation will stop.

3.4
3.4.1

Dynamic Failure Model
Overview of the Dynamic Failure Model

Here we first give an overview of the developed dynamic failure model. The dynamic failure model is developed to enable (1) fast estimation of failure patterns under online operating conditions, and (2) to predict the propagation of cascades, as illustrated in Fig. 3.2. Offline analysis uses historical or simulated cascade data under different operating conditions
to learn all the failure interactions among components under different system states. The
real-time analysis, using PMU measurements, identifies only those interactions (among
all) that apply to real-time conditions, hence referred to as dynamic interactions. Once the
updated interaction model is generated, a methodology developed in this work, referred
to as the propagation tree method, is used to predict potential propagation of cascades.
Eventually, this model helps power system operators better understand the outcomes of
the potential failures under the present system operating condition.
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Offline
Varying loads to
generate different
operating conditions

Generating random
initial failures

Real-Time Power System
Measurements
PMU

PMU

PMU

Cascading failure model
Collecting cascades data

Estimating all system
interactions

Constructing failure
model under online
operating condition

Predicting the
propagation of
cascades using
Propagation tree

Figure 3.2: Development of a dynamic failure model for predicting cascades

3.4.2

Estimating the Dynamic Interactions

An interaction is defined as the probability of one component’s failure, given the failure of other components. Conventional interaction estimation model is firstly introduced
in [68] to identify critical system components that have large contribution to cascading failures. The same authors have further improved the conventional interaction model in [69]
to use an efficient estimation technique, i.e., Expectation Maximum (EM) algorithm, to
estimate component failure interactions with less cascade data. While the main idea of
calculating failure interactions is the same, the difference is in the estimation algorithm.
Although conventional interaction models can capture the propagation patterns from cascade data, they neglect how component failure interactions vary with different loading
levels of system components. Intuitively, a transmission line with a higher loading ratio of
Power Flow
Thermal Capacity is more likely to fail compared to a line with a lower loading ratio. To
capture the effect of line loading on the propagation of cascades, we develop a dynamic
interaction model that incorporates the system loading conditions into the failure interactions. Hence, the model enables updating the interactions based on the up-to-date power
flows. A dynamic interaction between failures of two components can be thought of as a
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conditional failure probability P (j | i, rj ):
P (j | i, rj ) = P (j fails in generation k + 1 | i fails in

(3.1)

generation k, loading ratio of line j),
where P (j |i, rj ) is the probability of line j failing, given that line i has failed and loading
ratio for line j is rj . The loading ratio (or state) rj for line j is defined as,

rj =

pfj
pfjmax

(3.2)

where pfj and pfjmax are the apparent power flow and maximum apparent power flow
capacity of line j. With the obtained cascade data under different operating conditions,
Bayes’ theorem is used to estimate the conditional probability P (j | i, rj ) [76],

P (j | i, rj ) =

P (j, rj | i)
P (rj | i)

(3.3)

where P (j, rj | i) is the joint probability of the failure of line j and the state of line j, given
line i has failed in the previous generation. P (rj | i) is the conditional probability of the
state of line j given the failure of line i. In this study, the loading conditions of system
components in a cascade are the states before the occurrence of the initial failures, as in a
statistical model it is infeasible to predict the changes in the loading conditions during the
propagation of cascades.
To estimate the conditional failure probability P (j, rj | i) in (3.3), the methodology introduced by Qi et al. [68] is adopted. Under a specific loading ratio r, an interaction matrix
A ∈ Rn×n can be obtained, where n is the number of system components. The interaction
matrix summarizes the interactions between system components using the stages of cascade data. The elements of A, Aij , represent the number of times, among all generations
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of all cascades, component j fails subsequent to the failure of component i in the previous
generation, when the loading ratio of component j is rj .
The conventional interaction model in [68] assumes that the failure of component j in a
generation is only subsequent to one component’s outage in the previous generation; and
that component is the one that has led component j to fail the most among all the cascades.
This is due to the difficulty in identifying the complete cause of subsequent outages in
cascade data. After obtaining A, the empirical failure interaction probability between two
failed components can be computed and recorded in an interaction probability matrix B,
with its elements Bij =

Aij
ni

. Bij is the interaction probability between lines i and j, i.e. the

empirical joint failure probability of the state of line j and the failure of line j caused by
line i, and ni is the number of times component i fails among all cascades. The probability matrix B quantifies the interaction between any two lines during the propagation of
cascades under a specific line loading ratio. Bij can be thought of as the conditional failure
probability P (j, rj | i).
The initial failures in the first generation are often caused by exogenous events, e.g., a tree
falling on a line, while failures in the subsequent generations are caused by the outages of
other system components [77]. Hence, the dynamic interaction between two components
is separated into two different interactions: (1) initial interaction P0 (j | i, ri , rj ) and (2)
subsequent interaction P1+ (j | i, rj ), defined as
P0 (j, rj , ri | i)
,
P0 (rj , ri | i)
P1+ (j, rj | i)
P1+ (j | i, rj ) =
,
P1+ (rj | i)

P0 (j | i, ri , rj ) =

(3.4)
(3.5)

where 0 and 1+ denote the initial generation and subsequent generations of cascades,
respectively. The initial interaction is extracted from the outaged components between
the first and second generations, while the subsequent interactions are obtained from all
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cascade generations except the first generation. The benefits achieved by dividing the
initial and subsequent interactions separately will be discussed further in Section III-C.
For simplicity, we use D to denote dynamic interaction matrices, and D0 and D1+ to
denote the initial and subsequent interaction matrices for the rest of the chapter.
It can be observed from (3.2) that the loading ratio rj is in range [0, 1]. It is impractical to
estimate the failure probability of line j for any rj , as rj is a continuous value. Therefore,
instead of estimating failure probability P0 (j | i, ri , rj ) and P1+ (j | i, rj ) for any loading
ratio r, based on Bayes’ theorem, we discretize the two interaction probabilities as [76],
m m+1
n n+1
), rj ∈ [ ,
)),
P0 (j | i, ri ∈ [ ,
b
b
b
b
P1+ (j | i, rj ∈ [

m m+1
,
),
b
b

(3.6)

(3.7)

where b is the number of bins used to discretize continuous variable r and m, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , b−
1}. For instance, if we use two bins, i.e., b = 2, there are four initial interactions:
P0 (j | i, ri ∈ [0, 0.5), rj ∈ [0, 0.5)), P0 (j | i, ri ∈ [0, 0.5), rj ∈ [0.5, 1.0)), P0 (j | i, ri ∈
[0.5, 1.0), rj ∈ [0, 0.5)) and P0 (j | i, ri ∈ [0.5, 1.0), rj ∈ [0.5, 1.0)). Also, there are two
subsequent interactions: P1+ (j | i, rj ∈ [0, 0.5)) and P1+ (j | i, rj ∈ [0.5, 1.0)).

3.4.3

Predicting the Cascade Propagation

In the previous section, the dynamic interactions between system components were estimated and a methodology to incorporate online measurements into these interactions was
introduced. To predict potential cascades online, we develop a methodology to calculate
the failure probability of each component in each generation of a cascade. In this study, as
the causes of the initial events are exogenous, we only focus on analyzing the propagation
of cascades. Calculation of failure probabilities is conducted by constructing a Propagation Tree, an example of which is shown in Fig. 3.3. Each layer of the tree corresponds to
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a generation of a cascade, and each node in a layer represents a component that might fail
in the corresponding generation. An edge (i.e., branch) in a propagation tree denotes the
interaction between two nodes in two consecutive layers. When the failure probability of
a component in a generation is lower than a threshold ε, it is assumed that this component
would not generate subsequent child failures. Thus, the corresponding node in the propagation tree becomes a leaf node, such as node 3 in generations 3 and 5 in Fig. 3.3. The
steps to construct a propagation tree are:

Generation 1

Component

1 failed

(Initial Failure)

P0

Generation 2
(Potential Failure)

Component

Component

2 failed

3 failed

P1 

Generation 3

Component

Component

Component

3 failed

5 failed

6 failed

(Potential Failure)

P1 

Generation 4

Component

8 failed

(Potential Failure)

P1 

Generation 5

Component

3 failed

(Failure Stops)

Figure 3.3: An example of a propagation tree

Step 1

Given the online operating conditions of each system component, rq , q ∈ {1, 2, ..., n},
where n is the total number of system components, the corresponding initial P0current
current
and subsequent P1+
interactions in (3.6) and (3.7) are found among the interac-

tions studied offline;
Step 2

Given the initial failed components, column vector V1 is constructed to represent
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the failure probability of each component at the beginning of a cascade. V1 (i) = 1
denotes component i is part of the initial failures while V1 (i) = 0 denotes compo′

nent i did not fail at the beginning of a cascade. Define V1 = e − V1 to describe the
survival probability of each component where e is an all-ones column vector.
Step 3

Set G = 2 (second generation). Given the initial interaction P0current , the failure
probability of each component in the second generation is calculated:

V2 (i) = 1 −
′

N1
Y
(1 − V1 (j)P0current (i | j)),

(3.8)

j=1

′

V2 (i) = V1 (i)(1 − V2 (i)),

(3.9)

′

where V2 and V2 store the failure and survival probability of each component in the
second generation, respectively. N1 is the total number of initially failed components in the first generation. Following past literature, we assume that component
failure probability follows a geometric distribution [78]. If no element in V2 is larger
than a user defined ε, go to Step 6; otherwise, go to Step 4.
Step 4

current
Set G = G + 1. Using the subsequent interaction P1+
, the failure probability

of each component in the Gth generation is calculated. Note that a system component may be predicted as a potential failure in more than one generation of the
propagation tree, e.g., component 3 is predicted to fail in generations 2, 3 and 5 in
Fig. 3.3. As a component cannot fail more than once in a cascade, the probability
that a component only fails in generation G and not fail in any previous generations
is calculated by extracting a subtree from the propagation tree for that component.
In this subtree, the component in question only appears in generation G and the
potential occurrences of this component in any previous generations are removed.
For example, for the propagation tree in Fig. 3.3, to calculate the failure probability
of component 3 in generation 5, a subtree is generated and shown in Fig. 3.4. It
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can be observed that the component 3 only occurs in generation 5 and the potential
failures of component 3 in generations 2 and 3 are removed in the subtree. Given
the subtree for each component in generation G, its failure probability in generation
G is:
sub
NG−1

VG (i) = 1 −
′

Y
j=1

current
sub
(i | j)),
(j)P1+
(1 − VG−1

(3.10)

′

VG (i) = VG−1 (i)(1 − VG (i)),

(3.11)
′

where VG records the component failure probability at generation G, while VG stores
the survival probability of each component until generation G, i.e., the probability
sub
that a component does not fail in the first G generations. VG−1
(j) is the failure
sub
probability of component j in generation G − 1 of the subtree. NG−1
is the total

number of parent nodes of component i in generation G − 1 of the constructed
subtree.
Step 5

If no element in VG is larger than ε, go to Step 6; otherwise, return to Step 4.

Step 6

Construction of the propagation tree is stopped.

Once all components stop generating child failures, the propagation tree for a given operating condition is constructed. The failure probability of a component in a cascade can be
calculated as,
Vfinal (i) = 1 −

NG
Y

(1 − Vk (i))

(3.12)

k=1

where Vfinal (i) is the probability of component i fails in this this cascade. NG is the total
number of generations after constructing the propagation tree. It can be observed in the
construction steps of the propagation tree that the developed method enables calculating
the failure probability of a component in different generations, while the interaction model
in [68], its improvement in [69] and the event tree model cannot provide this information.
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Generation 1

Component

1 failed

(Initial Failure)

P0

Generation 2
(Potential Failure)

Component

Component

2 failed

3 failed
remove

P1 

Generation 3
(Potential Failure)

Component

Component

Component

3 failed

5 failed

6 failed

remove

remove

P1 

Generation 4

Component

8 failed

(Potential Failure)

P1 

Generation 5

Component

3 failed

(Failure Stops)

Figure 3.4: An illustration of the subtree of component 3 in generation 5
This is due to the fact that the interaction model ignores the component failure uncertainty,
that a component might fail in different generations with different probabilities and only
allows components to fail in a single generation. The propagation tree can be used to
analyze cascades and identify the most vulnerable areas of a system to cascading failures
in different generations. Notice that, when the topology changes due to maintenance, this
method can still be applied by updating the initial failure probability of other components
that are in service using (3.8).

3.4.4

Cascade Data Sufficiency

So far, the dynamic interaction model assumed that cascade data is sufficiently available
for constructing the initial and subsequent interaction matrices and ensuring accurate cascade prediction. Intuitively, more cascade data tends to provide more interaction information between components. However, the question of “how much data is sufficient for
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creating interaction matrices?” is yet to be answered.
Recent research studies [68–70] have introduced two criteria to assess the adequacy of
cascade data for constructing conventional interaction models. It is shown that with an
increase in the number of the cascades in the data, the total number of different interactions between components, i.e., the number of non-zeros in the interaction matrix B increases. However, the total number of different interactions does not significantly change
after the number of cascades reaches a threshold. Thus, to obtain most of the interactions between components, the change in the number of non-zeros is used to determine the
number of cascades required for building the interaction matrix B. Another lower bound
for the number of required cascade data is the number of cascades that can be used to
obtain the dominant interactions. By comparing the mismatch of propagation capacity,
i.e., the average number of failures in one cascade, between the original cascades and the
predicted cascades that are from interaction model, this lower bound of the number of
cascades can be determined. The objective of the conventional interaction model is to
identify key interactions that largely contribute to the propagation of cascades, while the
dynamic interaction model developed in this work is to predict the failure probability of
each component. In other words, the entries of the interaction matrix are more important
to the dynamic interaction model than the number of non-zeros when deciding on data
adequacy for constructing the dynamic interaction model.
The increased number of cascades will change the entries of the dynamic interactions but
the change would be limited when the total number of cascades is above a threshold. Here,
Frobenius norm is chosen to measure the change in the entries of the interaction matrices
and to determine the required number of cascades for building the dynamic interaction
model,
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Ei =

Di − Di−1 F
Nnz
r
PNbranch PNbranch
p=1

=

q=1

Nnz

dipq − di−1
pq

(3.13)

2

, i = 2, . . . , Ntotal

where Di and Di−1 are the dynamic interaction matrices, and i is the number of cascades.
Nnz is the number of non-zero elements in Di . ∥·∥F denotes the Frobenius norm, E i indicates the change of the dynamic interaction matrix when the number of cascades is i, dipq
i
i−1
, respecand di−1
pq are the elements in the pth row and qth column of matrix D and D

tively, Nbranch is the number of components, and Ntotal is the total number of cascades.

3.5

Simulation Results

The developed dynamic interaction model is evaluated on two test systems. The first test
system is the widely used IEEE 30-bus system, with 30 buses and 41 transmission lines,
representing a portion of the American Electric Power system [74]. The second system is a
synthetic electric grid case, i.e. Illinois 200-bus system, that is statistically and functionally
similar to real-world electric grids [79]. This system has a total of 200 buses and 245 lines.
The diagrams of these two test systems are given in Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6, respectively.
The cascade data is generated from simulations using AC-OPA [48] model. To evaluate
the performance of the dynamic interaction model, different performance analysis metrics
are used. Also, the developed dynamic interaction model is compared with four baselines:
Hines’ influence model [66], Qi’s interaction model [68], Qi’s EM model [69] and dynamic
interaction model without differentiating initial and subsequent failures. The goal is to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the developed dynamic interaction model in predicting
cascades, and highlight its contributions over the existing methodologies.
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Figure 3.5: Diagram of IEEE 30-bus system that has 30 buses and 41 transmission lines.
Red nodes represent generator buses and blue nodes represent load buses.

3.5.1

Cascade Data Preparation

With the aforementioned simulation-based cascade model, a total of 160,000 and 240,000
cascades are generated for the IEEE 30-bus and Illinois 200-bus systems, respectively.
By gradually increasing the number of cascades, the changes in the dynamic interaction
matrices, in particular, initial interaction and subsequent interactions, for both test cases
are illustrated in Fig. 3.7 and Fig. 3.8. Setting the number of bins as two, four different
initial interaction matrices that correspond to P (j|i, ri ∈ [0, 0.5), rj ∈ [0, 0.5)), P (j|i, ri ∈
[0, 0.5), rj ∈ [0.5, 1.0)), P (j|i, ri ∈ [0.5, 1.0), rj ∈ [0, 0.5)), P (j|i, ri ∈ [0.5, 1.0), rj ∈
[0.5, 1.0)), and two different subsequent interaction matrices P (j|i, rj ∈ [0, 0.5)) and
P (j|i, rj ∈ [0.5, 1.0)) are extracted from the cascade data. It can be observed that the
change in dynamic interaction matrices for both the initial and subsequent interactions
becomes smaller with an increase in the number of cascades, particularly when the number of cascades is small. In other words, more cascade data provides more interaction
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Figure 3.6: Diagram of Illinois 200-bus system that has 200 buses and 245 transmission
lines. Red nodes represent generator buses and blue nodes represent load buses.
information. However, when the number of cascades is above a threshold, the Frobenious
norm E is close to zero, which means interactions do not change with more cascade data.
The change in the Frobenious norm, determines the number of cascade data required for
the IEEE 30-bus and Illinois 200-bus systems to be approximately 140,000 and 200,000,
respectively.
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Figure 3.7: Variations of the Frobenius norm calculated for the dynamic interaction matrix
for IEEE 30-bus system
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Figure 3.8: Variations of the Frobenius norm calculated for the dynamic interaction matrix
for Illinois 200-bus system

3.5.2

Evaluation Metrics

Here we use five metrics to evaluate the prediction accuracy of the dynamic failure model.
1. Jaccard Coefficient
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Jaccard coefficient is used to measure the similarity between two sets ATruth and APredicted [80]:

J (ATruth , APredicted ) =

|ATruth ∩ APredicted |
,
|ATruth ∪ APredicted |

(3.14)

where ATruth and APredicted are the set of truly failed and predicted failed components in
a cascade, respectively. ATruth can be obtained from the original cascade data, while
Apredicted is determined by comparing the total failure probability of each component,
i.e., Vfinal in (3.12), with a threshold ε. If the total failure probability of a component
is above ε, this component is regarded as a potential failure in a cascade. For temporal
failures, ATruth can be obtained from the original data in each generation of a cascade,
while Apredicted is determined by comparing the failure probability of each component
in a generation, VG in (3.10), with a threshold ε.
2. F1 Score
F1 score is a weighted average of the Precision and Recall, which measures the prediction accuracy of the dynamic interaction model [81]. Here, Precision is the fraction
of potential failures that indeed fail in a cascade, while Recall is the fraction of failed
components that are successfully predicted as impending failures [82].
|ATruth ∩ APredicted |
,
|APredicted |
|ATruth ∩ APredicted |
Recall =
,
|ATruth |
Precision · Recall
F1 score = 2 ·
.
Precision + Recall

Precision =

(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17)

3. Precision@K (Precision at K)
Precision@K, inspired by [83], is the fraction of components that have failed among
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the top K predicted potential failures:

Precision@K =

ATruth ∩ AK
Predict, Sort
,
K

(3.18)

where K is user-defined, and set to the number of components that indeed fail in a
cascade. AK
Predict, Sort is the top K predicted failures in the sorted set of potential failures APredict, Sort , where potential failures are sorted based on their corresponding failure
probabilities.
4. Kendall’s Tau (τ )
τ is a correlation coefficient used to measure the association between two ranking methods, where τ is in the range of [−1, 1] [84]. τ = 1 shows a complete agreement, and
τ = −1 shows a complete disagreement between the two ranking methods. τ = 0
means the two ranking methods are independent [84]. Given two rankings (orders)
A : a1 , ..., an and B : b1 , ..., bn , consider pair (ai , bi ) and (aj , bj ). If ai > aj and bi > bj or
ai < aj and bi < bj , the pair is concordant; If ai > aj and bi < bj or ai < aj and bi > bj ,
the pair is discordant; and If ai = aj or bi = bj , the pair is a tie [85]. τ is formulated as,

τ=q
P
[nall − ti=1

nc − nd

ti (ti −1)
]
2

nall =

· [nall −

n(n − 1)
,
2

uj (uj −1)
]
j=1
2

,

Pu

(3.19)

where nc and nd are the number of concordant and discordant pairs, respectively. n
is the number of elements in the ranking orders A and B, t and u are the number of
different group of ties in rank A and B, and ti and uj are the number of elements in the
ith and j th group of ties in A and B, respectively. For example, given the ranking order
A that has seven elements (n = 7) as 1 2 2 3 4 4 4, the number of different group of ties
are two (t = 2) since the rankings 2 and 4 appear more than once, that is, two elements
are ranked with the same order 2 (t1 = 2) and three elements are ranked with the order
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4 (t2 = 3).
As components in a generation of a cascade either fail or survive, they cannot be ranked;
hence, a heuristic ranking method is used for components that have indeed failed at each
generation. In this heuristic method, the rank for failed and survived components are
set to 1 and 2, respectively. For those components that are predicted to fail, the rank is
assigned based on the corresponding failure probabilities. Hence, Kendall’s Tau can be
used to evaluate the similarity between the predicted and the real failed components in
each generation of a cascade.
5. The average precision of the top N generations
The average precision of the top N generations is also assessed in this chapter. Incorrectly predicted failures in one generation of a cascade will lead to wrong predictions in
all subsequent generations. As the initial cascade generations are more influential in determining operator actions, the average precision of the top N generations, AvgNPrecision ,
is used to evaluate the performance of the developed failure prediction methodology.

AvgNPrecision

PN
=

i=1

Precisioni
N

(3.20)

where Precisioni is the precision for the ith generation. Since most cascades stop within
10 generations, N is set to 10.

3.5.3

Determining Optimal Failure Model Parameters

In addition to the previously collected cascade data for the IEEE 30-bus and the Illinois
200-bus systems, another 50,000 cascades for each test system is generated using the same
cascade data generation process to validate the performance of the developed interaction
model by using holdout cross validation method [86]. A threshold ε, is used to identify
the potential failures in each generation of a cascade. This threshold is varied from zero to
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one to find the optimal ε that yields the highest prediction accuracy. The F1 score of the
prediction of total failures with different ε in IEEE 30-bus and Illinois 200-bus systems
are given in Fig. 3.9. Here, these values are ε = 0.18 for the IEEE 30-bus system, and
ε = 0.15 for the Illinois 200-bus system.
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Figure 3.9: F1 score of prediction accuracy of total failures in IEEE 30-bus and Illinois
systems with different ε ∈ [0 1]

We found that the prediction accuracy of the developed interaction model increases with
the number of bins, b, that are used to discretize dynamic interactions. However, the
prediction accuracy did not change as the number of bins increased beyond a certain value.
By looking at the prediction accuracy while varying the numbers of bins from 1 to 100,
which is given in Fig. 3.10, we have set the number of bins for the IEEE 30-bus and Illinois
200-bus systems to 35 and 40, respectively.
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Figure 3.10: F1 score of prediction accuracy of total failures in IEEE 30-bus and Illinois
200-bus systems with different bins (from 1 to 100)

3.5.4

Performance Analysis

Once the minimum number of required cascade data is determined, the initial and subsequent interactions can be generated and used to predict potential cascades. If a component failure probability in a generation, calculated by the propagation tree, is larger
than a threshold ε, this component is regarded as a potential failure in the corresponding
generation of a cascade. To evaluate the prediction performance of the developed dynamic interaction model, the five aforementioned metrics are used. The performance of
the developed method is analyzed in terms of (1) how accurately all failures in a cascade,
referred to as total failures, are predicted (not considering which generation each failure
happened), and (2) how accurately failures in each generation of a cascade, referred to as
temporal failures, are predicted.
• Prediction Evaluation for Total Failures is performed using three metrics: Jaccard
coefficient, F1 score, and Precision@K;
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• Prediction Evaluation for Temporal Failures is performed using Jaccard coefficient, F1 score, Kendall’s Tau, and the average precision of the top N generations to
assess failure prediction accuracy in each cascade generation:
The prediction performance based on both total failures and temporal failures for two test
systems are provided in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. It can be observed that, in most cases, the
developed dynamic interaction model significantly outperforms the other four baselines
in terms of prediction accuracy for both total failures and temporal failures. The performance results of the developed dynamic interaction model with and without separating the
interactions also show that dividing the interactions into initial and subsequent interactions
has significant improvement in predicting the two different type of failures. Specifically,
for the total failures, the Jaccard coefficient of the dynamic interaction model is 0.8159
and 0.7988 for the IEEE 30-bus, and Illinois 200-bus systems, which means the similarity between the predicated failed components and real failed components is 81.59% and
79.88%, respectively. The F1 score (a weighted average for prediction accuracy) for the
two test systems reaches 84.77% and 80.58%, higher than that of the other four baselines.
Similarly, the precision@K values show that 89.72% and 85.26% of the top K predicted
failures are correctly predicted, where K is equivalent to the number of components that
have indeed failed. Low precision means more lines are incorrectly recognized as risky
lines, which would cause unnecessary actions such as relay blocking on those lines. These
unnecessary actions are costly and may decrease the system reliability. It can be observed
from the performance comparison results that the prediction precision is significantly improved by using the developed dynamic interaction model. In addition to the prediction
performance of the total failures, the prediction for the temporal failures also reaches a
high accuracy, although the accuracy is slightly decreased. The reason for this reduction
in accuracy is that a wrong prediction of a failed component in a generation would cause
wrong prediction of failed components in all subsequent generations of a cascade, which
can be thought of as a prediction noise. With the propagation of cascades, the effect of
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this noise is amplified and results in reduction in the prediction accuracy. For a better
illustration of the prediction accuracy in each generation of a cascade, and to decrease the
effect of the noise, the average precision of the top N generations for the two test systems are given in Fig. 3.11. We observe that the prediction accuracy decreases with the
increase in the number of top N generations. Compared to the other four baselines, the
developed interaction model provides a more precise prediction of the failed components
in a generation, especially for the top four generations. The values for Jaccard coefficient
and Kendall’s Tau also show a high degree of similarity and strong agreement between the
predicted outages and the real outages in each generation.
Table 3.1: Performance analysis of the proposed dynamic interaction model for the IEEE
30-bus system
Total Failures
Dynamic interaction
Developed
Metric

Qi’s

Qi’s EM

Hines’s

model without

Model [68]

Model [69]

model [66]

separating initial

dynamic
interaction model
and subsequent outages

Jaccard Coefficient

0.5436

0.5598

0.3257

0.7108

0.8159

F1 score

0.5631

0.5127

0.3344

0.7133

0.8477

Precision@K

0.6409

0.6058

0.3943

0.7713

0.8972

Temporal Failures
Jaccard Coefficient

0.4203

0.3965

0.1815

0.5631

0.7605

F1 score

0.4383

0.4058

0.2008

0.5864

0.7866

Kendall’s tau

0.7888

0.7478

0.7976

0.8122

0.8726
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Table 3.2: Performance analysis of the proposed dynamic interaction model for the Illinois
200-bus system
Total Failures
Dynamic interaction
Developed
Metric

Qi’s

Qi’s EM

Hines’s

model without

Model [68]

Model [69]

model [66]

separating initial

dynamic
interaction model
and subsequent outages

Jaccard Coefficient

0.6720

0.7126

0.6600

0.5959

0.7988

F1 score

0.6589

0.6776

0.6649

0.5586

0.8058

Precision@K

0.7059

0.7690

0.7448

0.6274

0.8526

Temporal Failures
Jaccard Coefficient

0.6196

0.6577

0.6316

0.5219

0.7585

F1 score

0.6220

0.6580

0.6358

0.5273

0.7711

Kendall’s tau

0.8216

0.8360

0.8504

0.8575

0.8692

The computation time of the dynamic interaction model is also reported here to assess its
suitability in near real-time. The time required to online analysis of 1,000 cascades for
IEEE 30-bus and Illinois 200-bus systems using the dynamic interaction model are 8.1043
s and 250.2494 s, respectively, on a computer with an i7-7700 CPU, 4.2GHz core. Compared to the time it takes to analyze the same number of cascades using AC cascading
failure model, which is 300.7678 s for the IEEE 30-bus system and 1371.4187 s for the
Illinois 200-bus system, the time efficiency of the developed model is a clear improvement. Although the OPF approach in AC cascading failure model is fast if pre-calculated
solutions of some specific operation conditions are stored, it is impractical to calculate
and store solutions for all possible system operating conditions due to the numerous uncertainties present in today’s power grids, particularly from renewable energy resources.
It can be observed that the computation time would be increased with the size of the system. In terms of the type of the system, a well-connected network will resist more cascade
propagation, as it is more robust. Hence, the number of generations in a cascade in a
well-connected power system would be less than other loosely connected systems. As a
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Figure 3.11: Average precision with top N number of generations
consequence, the former would have shorter computation time using propagation tree due
to the less number of cascade generations that need to be estimated. Furthermore, in order
to make the developed dynamic interaction model more suitable for online applications,
several strategies are proposed here to speed up the computation time: 1) Instead of evaluating all N −1−1 and N −2 contingencies, it is suggested to apply the dynamic interaction
on the selected credible contingencies that can be obtained from various contingency selection methods [87–91]; 2) Only forecast the propagation of the first Kpredict ) generations
of a cascade as the initial progress of the failure propagation is more important to system
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operators to identify potential failures; 3) High performance computing can further reduce
the computation time.

3.6

Discussion

Analyzing the performance of different statistical cascading failure models has shown that
the developed dynamic interaction model provides more accurate prediction of the total
and temporal failures in each generation of a cascade. With the dynamic interaction model,
one is able to identify components that have high failure probability in the subsequent
failures, particularly at the beginning of a cascade, where the progress of the failures is
slow [92]. Therefore, operators can take targeted control actions that reduce the loading
ratio of the identified potential components or disable the corresponding relays to stop the
tripping of these components. The examples of cascade prediction for the IEEE 30-bus
and Illinois 200-bus systems are illustrated in Fig. 3.12 and Fig. 3.13. The real sequence
of the two cascades that are obtained from the AC-OPA model is given in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Example of two real sequence of failures in two test systems
IEEE 30-bus system
Generation

Illinois 200-bus system

Failed components

1

12, 36

41, 144, 208

2

10, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35

9, 10, 83, 112, 229, 230

3

16, 28, 34, 40, 41

8

It can be observed in Fig. 3.12 that, given the initial failures in generation one, i.e. lines
12 and 36 are out in IEEE 30-bus system, the obtained failure probabilities of lines 10,
29, 30, 31, 33 and 35 from the dynamic interaction model are close to one, which are in
accordance with the real failed components in generation 2 in Table 3.3. It is also seen
that the real failed components, i.e. components 16, 28, 34, 40 and 41, have high failure

Failure probability

74
Generation 1

1

0.5

0

Failure probability

0

5

10 12

15

20

25

30

3536

40

Bus ID
Generation 2

1

0.5

0

Failure probability

0

5

10

15

20

25

293031 33 35

40

Bus ID
Generation 3

1

0.5

0
0

5

10

1516

20

25

28 30 32 34

4041

Bus ID

Figure 3.12: Potential failures in each generation of a cascade in IEEE 30-bus system.
probability in generation three in Fig. 3.12. However, line 32 has high failure probability
in the generation 3 in Fig. 3.12 while it does not fail in the real case. Further investigation
shows that the power flow of line 32 is close to its limit. Comparing the real failure
sequence in Illinois 200-bus system with Fig. 3.13, the same observation is made: the
dynamic interaction model effectively identifies components that are prone to failure in
each generation. The only exception is the wrongly predicted (False positive) failure of
line 207 in the second generation. Although line 207 does not get overloaded, it is found
that the power flow of line 207 is close to its thermal rating. It can be observed from
the illustration results that the dynamic interaction model provides useful insights into the
potential failures in each generation of a cascade, that in turn can be used by the system
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Figure 3.13: Potential failures in each generation of a cascade in Illinois 200-bus system.
operators to take effective actions that prevent the propagation of cascades, in a timely
manner.

3.7

Conclusion

This chapter presents the dynamic cascading failure model, which facilitates prediction
of impending cascading failures under a specific power system operating condition. The
conventional statistical cascading failure models only capture the general propagation patterns of cascades. On the contrary, the dynamic failure model incorporates system operating conditions into the component failure interactions using a Bayesian approach, and thus
enables identifying component failure interactions that correspond to the latest available
line power flows. By analyzing simulated or historical cascade data, the interactions be-
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tween system components are estimated offline, and used in online operations to calculate
the failure probability of each system component using the introduced propagation tree
model. The prediction efficiency of the developed dynamic failure model is evaluated by
various metrics, showing a significant improvement over four other state-of-the-art methods in predicting total and temporal failures of a cascade. When an unexpected power
system failure occurs, the system operators can promptly identify the most probable component failures with the developed failure model. Hence, proper actions can be taken to
prevent further loss of system components.
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Chapter 4
Impact Prediction of Power System
Events in Transient State

4.1

Introduction

In our research, we have analyzed the PMU-based means for assessing the impact of failures in terms of steady-state in Chapter 5. With this tool, the impact of system failures can
be promptly minimized, and thus prevent the propagation of cascading failures. However,
it is not sufficient for improving system reliability, as the dynamics of the power system
have not been taken care of. When a three-phase fault occurs on a transmission line, all
generators’ rotor angles will swing together. One example of the dynamics of relative
generator rotor angles and bus voltage magnitudes is depicted in Fig. 4.1. As seen, large
excursions occur in the trajectories of the generator rotor angles and bus voltage magnitudes when the described fault occurs. This example has a stable transient as all generators
can remain synchronized. If generators cannot maintain synchronism, referred to as unstable transient, the grids may collapse and require immediate control actions, such as
controlled islanding, to split the unsynchronized generators. The example of the unstable
transient is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. It can be observed that, after a system failure, one of the
generators cannot keep synchronism with others.
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of the generator rotor angles (19 generators) and voltage magnitudes (118 buses) in IEEE 118-bus system. A three-phase short circuit has occurred on
line 102 at 0.167s and is cleared after 5 cycles (0.083 s).

Figure 4.2: Illustration of the unstable transient after a fault.
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In order to maintain stable transient, it is crucial to equip the grid operators with a fast, online transient stability assessment (TSA) tool to accurately determine the system dynamic
performance, at the earliest stage of the event. Thus, system operators can be granted with
adequate time to take proper mitigative actions, such as intentional islanding or controlled
load shedding.
As PMUs enables generating accurate measurements with high resolutions, the dynamics
of the system can be better observed. Here we develop a new PMU-based data-driven TSA
approach to predict the transient stability of a system while requiring much less transient
data than the conventional methods. The data reduction is enabled by learning the dynamic
behaviors of the historical transient data using generative and adversarial networks (GAN).
This knowledge is used online to predict the voltage time series data after a transient event.
A classifier embedded in the generative network deploys the predicted post-contingency
data to determine the stability of the system following a fault. The developed GAN-based
TSA approach preserves the spatial and temporal correlations that exist in multivariate
PMU time series data. Hence, in comparison with the state-of-the-art TSA methods, it
achieves a higher assessment accuracy using only one sample of the measured data and a
shorter response time.

4.2

Background

The conventional TSA methodologies belong to one of three categories: 1) time-domain
simulations, 2) direct methods, and 3) trajectory-based approaches. Time-domain methods solve a set of high-dimensional and nonlinear differential algebraic equations to assess
the transient stability [93, 94]. These methods assume complete knowledge of the system
model parameters and the operating conditions. However, their high computational complexity makes them impractical for near real-time applications. To enable faster transient
stability assessment, direct methods, e.g., Lyapunov method [95–97] and extended equal
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area criterion [98, 99], have been developed. The direct methods simplify TSA by energy
functions that evaluate the dynamic performance of the system in a shorter time [100,101].
Yet, because of the need to simplify the dynamic models, these methods do not scale well
to large power systems. The trajectory-based methods, such as Lyapunov exponents [102]
and apparent impedance [103] methods, are relatively fast. However, at least a few cycles
of post-fault transient data are needed for a precise stability assessment.
With the increased availability of high-resolution Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data,
new TSA approaches have emerged where physical system constraints and system data
inform each other for a more accurate TSA. Hence, without constructing a complete dynamic grid model, the dynamic stability status of power grids can be determined. Machine
learning methods such as decision trees [103–105], core vector machine [106], support
vector machine (SVM) [107], and extreme learning machine [108, 109] have previously
been deployed for TSA using system measurements, formulating TSA as a two-class (stable and unstable) classification problem. These data-driven methods require a conversion
from raw Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data to selected features, which may result
in the loss of critical dynamic information and adversely affect the classification accuracy. Deep learning methods, such as convolutional neural network (CNN) [110, 111],
long short-term memory (LSTM) [112, 113], gated recurrent unit (GRU) [114], and the
stacked denoising autoencoder (SDAE) [115] have been shown to address the problem of
information loss by directly utilizing raw PMU data. However, to guarantee the assessment accuracy, longer durations of post-contingency time series data are needed, which
will result in TSA delays. Longer delays are not desired for online TSA since the window
of opportunity for taking an effective corrective action may be missed.
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4.3

Hierarchical GAN-based Transient Stability Assessment

As explained in the Section 4.2, the existing TSA methods are not adequate for online
prediction of the transient status. To address the aforementioned gaps in data-driven TSA
methods, a neural network model, i.e., generative and adversarial network (GAN) model,
is extended in this section to predict the post-contingency PMU measurements, that will be
used for classification. The novelty of the developed TSA approach stems from the ability
to rapidly and accurately determine transient stability, while only utilizing one sample of
the measured post-contingency PMU data. This is achieved by developing a hierarchical
structure, shown in Fig. 4.3, for the refined generative adversarial networks. Several GAN
models are stacked together to construct HGAN. The input to the hierarchical generative
adversarial network (HGAN) is the measured post-contingency PMU data. The lowest
level GAN utilizes the measured PMU data to predict the measurements for the next sampling time. The subsequent predictions are used by higher level GANs to further predict
the PMU time series data. With the proposed structure, HGAN requires only a single
sample of the measured data to predict the post-contingency time series transient data. In
addition to the predicted sequence of the transient data, a binary classifier is embedded
in the generative network of each sub-GAN. Each sub-GAN performs TSA individually,
based on the measured one-sample PMU data as well as the predicted subsequent time
series data from the lower-level sub-GANs. The final TSA is achieved by combining the
assessment results from all sub-GANs, with a goal to reduce the prediction error.
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Figure 4.3: The structure of the developed HGAN-based TSA

4.3.1

Transient Stability Assessment

During a power system disturbance, such as a transmission line fault, large swings appear
in generator rotor angles, bus voltages, or line currents [115]. To ensure a stable grid, all
generators should maintain synchronism after the clearance of the faults. If the synchronism is lost, prompt mitigations such as controlled islanding need to be taken to prevent
further failures. This remarks the need for an online TSA approach that can promptly and
precisely identify the transient status at the earliest stages of a fault clearance.
Assume a power system has n generators and the loads are constant impedances, the transient of the generator i can be modeled as [116, 117],

ω̇i =

Pim − Pie − Di ωi
Mi

(4.1.1)

δ˙i = ωi
Pie

=

Ei2 Gii

+

n+1
X

Cij sin(δij ) +

j̸=i

(4.1.2)
n+1
X

Dij sin(δij )

(4.1.3)

j̸=i

Cij = Ei Ej Bij

(4.1.4)

Dij = Ei Ej Gij

(4.1.5)
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δij = δi − δj .

(4.1.6)

Here, a node n + 1 is modeled as the infinite bus such that En+1 = 1 and δn+1 = 0.
From (4.1.1) and (4.1.2), it can be observed that the rotor speed, electrical and mechanical
powers are the functions of rotor angle f (δi ). Since the rotor angle is typically used to
determine the transient stability, analyzing these three terms, i.e., P m , P e , and ω, can help
indirectly study the transient. When a severe disturbance occurs in power grids, the electrical power will immediately change, while the mechanical power and rotor speed will
respond later due to the inertial and governor in the prime mover. The different response
time can lead to imbalanced electrical and mechanical power, affecting the entire rotating
system of the grid, and may cause unstable transient. As the imbalanced power is mainly
due to the sudden change of the electrical power P e , the change of the electrical power
after the occurrence of the disturbance can be used to learn the transient stability. Furthermore, as observed in (4.1.3) that the electrical power P e is the function of the voltage, the
trajectory of the voltage can thus be used to study the transient stability.
Fig. 4.1 depicts the post-fault dynamics of the generator rotor angles and bus voltages in
the IEEE 118-bus system. A three-phase short circuit is simulated on line 102 at time instant 0.167s, which is cleared after 5 cycles, and Generator 1 is the reference machine. As
seen, large excursions occur in the trajectories of the generator rotor angles and bus voltage magnitudes when the described fault occurs. To classify the system transient stability
status, a commonly used stability index based on rotor angles is used [118]:

η=

360◦ − ∆σmax
360◦ + ∆σmax

(4.2)

where ∆σmax is the maximum post-fault angle difference between any two generators.
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The stability is defined as,
ϕ=



 stable;

η>0

(4.3)


unstable; η ≤ 0.
In the transient event depicted in Fig. 4.1, η = 41.3. Therefore, the IEEE 118-bus system
is considered stable after clearing the three-phase fault on line 102. However, using (4.2)
for determining the transient status requires the estimation of ∆σmax over a relatively
long time (a few seconds), which is not desired for online TSA. Hence, the objective of
the developed TSA approach, illustrated in Fig. 4.4a, is to acquire the transient status
at the earliest stages of a contingency. As illustrated in Fig. 4.4b, unlike the other machine learning-based TSA methodologies that require a large volume of post-contingency
PMU data, the developed method only requires the first sample of the PMU data after
the clearance of the faults. Thus, more time can be granted for finding the optimal corrective actions. In this work, the PMU voltage data are selected for TSA. As mentioned
in in [119], the generator rotor angle can not be measured directly by PMUs. Since the
focus of this section is to determine the system transient stability from PMU data, PMU
voltage magnitudes are used. Various data-driven TSA methods have used voltage data
to study the transients [112, 119–122]. The studies in [121] and [122] demonstrate that
voltage magnitude-based transient algorithms are faster, simpler, and could eliminate the
errors and extra pre-processing associated with the calculation of an angle reference. Additionally, the dynamic equation (4.1) has shown that the bus voltage data has abundant
information of the transient. It is also shown in Section 4.4.2 that only utilizing PMU voltage magnitude data is sufficient to achieve a high assessment accuracy. However, other
PMU measurements that contain the system response, such as bus voltage angles and line
current phasors, can also be deployed by the developed HGAN-based TSA method. Additionally, to mimic real power grids, only some buses are equipped with PMUs (e.g., 20
buses in the IEEE 118-bus system). The PMUs are added in a manner to ensure full system
observability.
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𝑥 𝑡 ⋯ 𝑥(𝑡 + 𝑁)

𝑥(𝑡)
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(a) The developed HGAN-based TSA method

(b) The conventional machine learning-based
TSA methods

Figure 4.4: The input and output of the developed HGAN model and the conventional machine
learning-based TSA methods. x(t) is the first sampled post-contingency PMU data. The number
of PMU samples is N .

4.3.2

The Generative Adversarial Network

GAN is an unsupervised learning approach that has been used for generating synthetic
images, music, and other time-series data [123–127]. GAN learns the distribution of a real
dataset and generates synthetic data that are close to real data [128]. GAN-based methods
have been previously developed to recover missing PMU data [129] and generate synthetic
PMU datasets [130–132].
GAN consists of two deep neural networks: generator G and discriminator D. The generator generates synthetic data while retaining the statistical features of the real data. The
discriminator differentiates the real data from the synthetic data. The two networks are
trained iteratively until a Nash equilibrium is achieved and the generated synthetic data
and real data cannot be distinguished [129].
For a random Gaussian noise space Z, the generator maps the input noise z drawn from Z
to a synthetic dataset x̂ as,
G(z|θg ) : z → x̂

(4.4)

where θg is the neural network parameters of G. The objective of the generator is to map
a random noise to synthetic data, such that the distribution of the synthetic data P (x̂) is
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close to the real data P (x). The discriminator D estimates the probability, D(·|θd ), that
the input data is real rather than synthetic, where θd the is the neural network parameters
of D. The discriminator aims to maximize the difference between the real and synthetic
data so that they could be distinguished,
Max V (G, D) =Ex∼P (x) [log D(x)]
D

(4.5)
+ Ez∼P (z) [log(1 − D(x̂)]

where V (·) is the loss function. The first term Ex∼P (x) [log D(x)] is the probability that
the discriminator classifies the real data as real. The second term is the probability that
the synthetic data x̂ generated from G is classified as fake by D. The objective of G is to
minimize the difference between the real and synthetic data,

Min V (G, D) = Ez∼P (z) [log(1 − D(x̂))].
G

(4.6)

As the generator and discriminator are trained together, the objective of GAN is to address
a minimax problem:
MinMax V (G, D) =Ex∼P (x) [log D(x)]
G

D

(4.7)
+ Ez∼P (z) [log(1 − D(x̂))].

The GAN training algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. In each training episode, by
leveraging the stochastic gradient descent algorithm, the generator and discriminator are
updated, such that the synthetic data are closer to the real data.
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Algorithm 1 The GAN training steps
Initialize the neural network parameters of the generator and discriminator, i.e., θg and θd
respectively for ep = 1, · · · , epmax do
Obtain a minibatch of the random noise z from P (z), and another minibatch of the real
data x from P (x) Generate the synthetic data x̂ = G(z|θg ) Feed the generated synthetic data x̂ and the real dataset x into the discriminator D, and obtain the estimated
probability D(x|θd ) and D(x̂|θd ) Update G and D by descending their gradients:
▽θg (Ez∼P (z) [log(1 − D(x̂))])
▽θd (Ex∼P (x) [logD(x)] + Ez∼P (z) [log(1 − D(x̂)])
end

4.3.3

Gated Recurrent Units for Feature Extraction from PMU Time
Series Data

When predicting the future dynamic response in a power system, it is critical to preserve
the spatial and temporal features of the time series data. Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs),
a variant of RNN, enable this by learning the spatial and temporal features of time series
data [133].
Equipped with directed cycles in network connections, RNN retains information from past
data, so that it can be combined with the present data to more accurately predict the future sequence of data. However, RNN suffers from the vanishing or exploding gradient
problem during training [134]. If the RNN is not designed properly, the gradient may be
exponentially updated towards zero, referred to as a vanishing gradient, or exponentially
diverge to infinity, referred to as an exploding gradient. Either of these problems challenges the proper RNN training. To resolve this problem, GRU is equipped with a specific
mechanism to determine the volume of past data, to be added to the output. By doing so,
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the problem of vanishing or exploding gradient is eliminated. As illustrated in Fig. 4.5,
GRU consists of three elements: the reset gate, the update gate, and the current memory
unit [133]. The update gate determines the volume of past data that are used for predicting
the future data sequence, while the reset gate determines the volume of the stored past
information to be forgotten. The current memory unit uses the output from the reset gate
to store the relevant information from the past data. The output of GRU is the sum of the
output from the three gates. The three gates and the final output can be described as,

rt = σ(W r xt + U t ht−1 )

(4.8.1)

zt = σ(W z xt + U z ht−1 )

(4.8.2)

ht = tanh(W xt + rt ⊙ U ht−1 )

(4.8.3)

′

′

ht = zt ⊙ ht−1 + (1 − zt ) ⊙ ht .

(4.8.4)

In (4.8), W and U are the weights of the GRU network, and ⊙ is the Hadamard (elementwise) product. With this specific GRU structure, the transient sequence can be predicted.
The premise of this method is to use only one sample of the measured PMU data. This
critical advantage is enabled by learning the spatial and temporal features of the transient
data. The added discriminator to the GRU, enables further capturing the distribution of the
transient data.

4.3.4

The Developed HGAN-based TSA Method

The developed HGAN-based TSA, shown in Fig. 4.3, aims to predict the post-fault transients and assess the system’s transient stability. The GAN structure is also improved by
learning the spatial and temporal features of the multivariate PMU time series data. As
deploying one type of PMU data is sufficient to assess the transient stability, the PMU
voltage magnitude data are utilized for TSA. However, other PMU measurements could
also be used. Additionally, the developed HGAN adjusts the conventional GAN model
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Figure 4.5: The structure of GRU
to predict the PMU sequence data. Conventional GAN takes random noises to produce
synthetic data, while the refined GAN takes the real measurements as input to predict the
transient sequence. Here, the measured post-fault PMU voltage magnitudes are the inputs
to the GAN model, i.e., x(t). The data for the next time instant, i.e., x̂(t + 1) are predicted by the aforementioned GAN structure. However, the measured data x(t) and the
predicted data x̂(t + 1) may not have sufficient information to determine the transient status. To address this deficiency, a recursive strategy for multi-step prediction is developed.
The developed model uses the predictions from prior time steps to forecast the values in
future time steps. The developed strategy is to stack multiple GANs to predict a longer sequence of future data. As a result, a higher transient assessment accuracy can be achieved.
With N stacked GANs, the measured PMU post-fault voltage data is fed into the lowest
level GAN, i.e., GAN 1 to predict the data for the next time instant x̂(t + 1). The predicted data and the measured data x(t) and fed into GAN 2 for subsequent predictions.
Therefore, the HGAN-based TSA with N GANs generates N + 1 voltage time series data,
{x(t), x̂(t + 1), · · · , x̂(t + N )}.
A binary classifier is embedded in each generator of the stacked GANs for TSA classification. In each GAN k, the embedded classifier utilizes the input sequence data {x(t), x̂(t +
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1), · · · , x̂(t + k − 1)} to determine the TSA classification, i.e., stable or unstable. The
classification results from all sub-GANs are then combined by using an average-based
ensemble strategy to determine the final transient stability assessment. The generator has
three objectives: 1) learning the distribution of the real measurements; 2) using the learned
distribution to predict the next sequence of the time series data; 3) assessing the transient
stability status. Based on these objectives, the generator loss function in GAN k is formulated as,
LGk = log(1 − D(x̂(t + k))) + (x̂(t + k) − x(t + k))2

(4.9)

+ y log(p(y)) + (1 − y) log(1 − p(y))
where y is the binary label of the transient data. Here, a zero label is assigned to unstable
transients, and one to stable transients. The probability that the data is labeled as stable is
defined by p(y). In formulating the loss function in (4.9), the square of the error, (x̂(t +
k) − x(t + k))2 , is used to minimize the error of the predicted data x̂(t + k). The cross
entropy loss y log(p(y)) + (1 − y) log(1 − p(y)) is included so that the generator correctly
classifies the system stability status. The structure of the discriminator D in the developed
model is consistent to the conventional GAN, where the difference between the real and
predicted data will be maximized. In addition, the GRU structure is used to construct
generative and adversarial neural networks to better learn the spatial and temporal features
of the time series data.
The detailed structure of GAN k (k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N }) is illustrated in Fig. 4.6. The input to
GAN k is the measured and predicted PMU voltage data X = {x(t), x̂(t + 1), · · · , x̂(t +
k − 1)}, X ∈ Rk×NP M U , where NP M U is the total number of PMUs deployed in the
system. The input X is first fed into the GRU cell in the generator to learn the spatial
and temporal features of the time series data. To improve the learning efficiency, the fully
connected layer is added after the GRU cell. As the generator has two different outputs,
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i.e., the predicted label and subsequent data, two parallel fully connected layers are used
to separately perform these two tasks. To generate the predicted label y and the predicted
data x̂(t + k), the softMax and Sigmoid activation functions are deployed to interpret the
fully connected layer output. GRU is also leveraged in discriminator to construct the
neural networks. The output of the GRU in the discriminator is sent to the fully connected
layer, followed by a linear activation function that converts the output to the estimated
probability of the input data D(·|θd ). The probability is backpropagated to the generator
to update the parameters of the generative network.
Input

Input
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Figure 4.6: The structure of GAN k in the HGAN-based TSA

The prediction accuracy of the upper level GAN depends largely on the accuracy of the
lower GANs. A small prediction error from a lower level GAN will propagate to the higher
levels and eventually lead to a large prediction error. Hence, in this section, the GANs are
trained sequentially. For instance, when training GAN k, the network parameters of the
well-trained lower GANs i, (i ∈ {0, · · · , k − 1}), are kept fixed. Otherwise, repeatedly
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updating the well-trained networks of the lower GANs when training the upper GANs will
cause an overfitting problem, and thus reduce the prediction accuracy. The training process
of the HGAN-based TSA is given in Algorithm 2. For each GAN model, deploying the
stochastic gradient descent algorithm, the generator and the discriminator are updated until
the convergence of the cross-entropy loss, or until the training episode reaches its maximal
epmax , whichever occurs sooner.
Algorithm 2 The training algorithm for the developed HGAN-based TSA
Normalize the data such that the maximum normalized voltage is one for i = 1, · · · , N
do
Initialize the neural network parameters of the generator and discriminator, i.e., θg and
θd in GAN i, respectively for ep = 1, · · · , epmax do
Obtain a minibatch of the measured post-fault PMU voltage data x(t) and x(t + i)
Using the well-trained lower GANs k, k ∈ {1, · · · , i − 1} to obtain the sequence
data {x(t), x̂(t + 1), · · · , x̂(t + i − 1)} Feed the obtained sequence data to the generator G, generate the data label y, and predict data x̂(t + i) for the next sampling
time Input the predicted data x̂(t + i) and real data x(t + i) to the discriminator
D, and obtain the estimated probability D(x̂(t + i)|θd ) and D(x(t + i)|θd ) Update
the generator and discriminator with gradient descent algorithm;
end
Save the network parameters θg and θd for GAN i
end

The trained HGAN-based TSA can be applied online for stability assessment. Once finishing training, the well-trained HGAN-based TSA can be deployed for online TSA. Upon
measuring the first post-fault PMU voltage data, v(0), the HGAN-based model with N
sub-GANs generates the subsequent voltage data {v(0), v̂(1), · · · , v̂(N )}. The TSA results from these N sub-GANs will be combined by using an average-based ensemble
technique for the final TSA classification. Here, it is assumed that the final TSA result
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is stable if more than half of sub-GANs vote for stable; otherwise, the system is unstable.
The ensemble method reduces the variance of the prediction errors in all sub-GANs and
results in a more accurate TSA [135].

4.4

Simulation Results

To evaluate the performance of the HGAN-based TSA under various system operating
conditions, the IEEE 118-bus system with 118 buses, 170 lines, and 9 transformers is
studied. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the HGAN-based TSA method, five different
baseline methods, namely, decision trees, SVM, LSTM, GRU, and stacked GRU are used
for comparison purposes. Furthermore, as the TSA accuracy of the HGAN-based method
relies on PMU measurements, sensitivity studies are performed to investigate the impact
of noise, number, and location of PMUs on TSA accuracy. The simulations are conducted
on an i7 computer with a 3.2GHz CPU and 64GB RAM.

4.4.1

PMU Data Generation

The post-fault PMU voltage time series for testing and training are generated with simulations. Various operating conditions (ranges from 90% to 110% of the nominal loading
condition) are simulated under different system typologies, i.e., normal and one line out of
service (due to maintenance). The contingencies considered in this section are three-phase
faults on every bus and transmission line (located at 30%, 50%, and 80% of the lines). To
consist with the other data-driven TSA studies, the faults are cleared after 5 cycles, and the
system topology is kept unchanged after clearing the fault [121]. To minimize the adverse
impacts of an imbalanced dataset on the accuracy of the HGAN-based TSA, 5,000 stable
and 5,000 unstable transients are randomly picked from the generated transients. Furthermore, 80% of the data are used for training, and the remaining 20% are utilized for testing.
For creating stability labels, the transient stability of each event is determined using the in-
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Table 4.1: PMU placement in the IEEE 118-bus system

Test System
IEEE 118-bus system

PMU placement
5, 12, 15, 17, 32, 37, 49, 56,
59, 67, 69, 70, 71, 77, 80, 85,
92, 96, 100, 105

dex outlined in (4.2). To generate the PMU time series data, the sampling frequency of the
simulation is set to 120 frames per second. Additionally, to mimic real power grids where
not every bus is equipped with PMUs, 20 PMUs are deployed in the IEEE 118-bus system
to ensure full observability [136]. The locations of the PMUs are given in Table 4.1, and
are determined by spanning tree method. The training and testing data can be found at the
IEEE DataPort (https://dx.doi.org/10.21227/6f5v-q924).

4.4.2

Performance Analysis of the HGAN-based TSA

—Performance Analysis: Upon obtaining the training and testing datasets that contain
transient events, each level GAN of the developed TSA model is trained, following the
training steps outlined in Algorithm 2. The training parameters are provided in Table 4.2.
It is found that the HGAN-based model with three GANs is sufficient for an accurate stability assessment. Although more GANs generate longer duration of voltage time series
data, and thus better represent a transient pattern, a small error in lower level GANs could
propagate through the stacked GANs, and eventually lead to a large cumulative error. The
learning rates of the generator and discriminator are set to 0.001 and 0.0001, respectively.
A larger learning rate can increase the learning speed, while the results may converge to
a suboptimal solution. Additionally, to address the overfitting problem during the training
of a GAN, the neural network parameters of the lower level GANs are not updated. Overall, the training time for three sub-GANs is approximately 3.5 hours with CPU. As the
training of the HGAN is only conducted once and offline, this training time is reasonable.
Furthermore, the training time can be significantly reduced with GPU.
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Table 4.2: Parameters of the HGAN-based TSA model

Parameters
Number of GANs
Number of episode
Learning rate of generator / discriminator
Number of GRU layers / hidden layers
Batch size

Value
3
20000
1e-3 / 1e-4
2 / 30
128

To demonstrate the learning ability of the HGAN-based model, the cross-entropy loss and
the squared error of each sub-GAN in (4.9) are depicted in Fig. 4.7. To check for overfitting, the testing data is used to test the model in each training step. Note that the testing
data are not used to train the HGAN-based model. As seen from Fig. 4.7, for all three
GANs, the cross-entropy loss and the squared error dramatically decrease at the beginning of the training phase and converge after that. For instance, the cross-entropy loss
for training data in GAN 1 drops from 0.7 to 0.33, and the squared error of the training
data decreases from 0.1965 to 0.0002. It is also found that with the predicted data from
lower GANs, the cross-entropy loss of GAN 2 and 3 drops faster than the loss in GAN
1. The faster drop indicates that combining the predicted and the measured data leads to
more distinguishable transient features for the GAN model, and thus the learning speed
is increased. The cross-entropy loss and the squared error reduction indicate that the developed model is effectively trained to improve the classification and prediction accuracy.
Comparisons of the training and testing loss and error demonstrate that no overfitting occurs. This is concluded by the fact that the cross-entropy loss of the testing data does not
rise as the loss of the training data decreases. In other words, both these values maintain a
consistent difference.
Upon training the developed HGAN model, the testing data, i.e., 1000 stable and 1000
unstable events, are used to evaluate the classification accuracy of each GAN. The classification results are presented in Table 4.3. With the single measured PMU voltage data,
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Figure 4.7: The cross-entropy loss and the squared error for each of the three GANs in the
HGAN-based model.
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Table 4.3: TSA classification accuracy (F1 score) of each GAN in the HGAN-based TSA

Accuracy

GAN 1
95.88 %

GAN 1

GAN 2
99.95 %
GAN 2

GAN 3
99.95 %
GAN 3

Predicted
Actual

Unstable

Stable

Unstable

Stable

Unstable

Stable

Unstable

100%

0%

100%

0%

100%

0%

Stable

8.6%

91.4%

0.1%

99.9%

0.1%

99.9%

Figure 4.8: The confusion matrix of each GAN in the HGAN-based TSA model
the classification accuracy of the lowest level GAN 1 is 95.35%. However, combining the
real measured data and the predicted data from the lower level GANs yields a classification accuracy of 99.95% for both GAN 2 and GAN 3. Since a single sampled data carries
limited transient information, the classification accuracy of GAN 1 is only 95.3%. With
more predicted data that hold the spatial and temporal features of a transient event, the
hidden oscillation patterns of the event are more apparent to the classifiers and result in
higher classification accuracy. The confusion matrix of each GAN is depicted in Fig. 4.8.
For GAN 1, it can be observed that all unstable transient data are correctly identified, while
8.6% of the stable events are incorrectly classified as unstable. Benefiting from the predicted PMU voltage data from GAN 1, in GAN 2, the percentage of misclassified stable
events drops to 0.1%. Combining the classification results from these three GANs with an
average-based ensemble strategy yields an accuracy of 99.95% for TSA. Hence, by stacking three sub-GANs, the HGAN model achieves high classification accuracy with only
one sampled PMU data. The computation time for the developed TSA with three GANs is
0.00298s (0.359 cycles). The total response time, including the waiting time for one cycle
of the PMU data, is 1.359 cycles, which is reasonable for near real-time analysis.
—Comparison with Baseline Methods: To demonstrate the effectiveness of the developed data-driven TSA approach, it is compared with conventional data-driven methods
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that deploy decision trees, SVM, LSTM, and GRU. The inputs to the baseline methods
are the measured post-fault PMU voltage data. For the highest classification accuracy, the
LSTM hyperparameters, namely, the learning rate, training iteration, number of layers,
hidden layers, and batch size are set to 0.0005, 40000, 2, and 40, and 128 respectively.
Similarly, for GRU, optimal learning rate, training iteration, number of layers, and hidden
layers are found to be 0.0005, 40000, 2, and 50, respectively. The comparisons are presented in Table 4.4 and Fig. 4.9. Compared with SVM, LSTM, and GRU, the decision
trees, stacked-GRU, and the HGAN-based TSA achieve higher classification accuracy, using only one sample of PMU measurements. To reach this TSA classification accuracy,
the stacked GRU and HGAN-based methods require shorter response times, i.e., 1.124
and 1.359 cycles, respectively. Although the SVM, GRU, and LSTM-based TSA methods
achieve the similar classification accuracy at around 2 cycles, the reduction of 0.65 cycles
achieved by the developed HGAN-based method is critical for online TSA. The transient
instability issues propagate rapidly in the grids. Hence, a faster TSA allows more time for
mitigative actions to prevent cascading outages. The response time is the combination of
the waiting time for sufficient PMU samples and the computation time of the TSA method.
To demonstrate the benefits of the discriminator in the HGAN model, a stacked GRU
model, where only the generator is retained, is utilized to assess the transient stability. The
settings of the stacked GRU are the same as the HGAN model. The overall classification
accuracy, response time, and the classification accuracy of each sub-GRU are given in Table 4.4, Fig. 4.9 and Table 4.5, respectively. Due to the GRU structure, the stacked GRU
also enables learning the temporal correlations of the sequence data, and achieves a high
TSA classification accuracy, i.e., 99.1% with 1.12 cycles. However, in comparison to the
TSA classification accuracy of each sub-GAN in Table 4.3, it can be found that GAN 2
and 3 achieve higher classification accuracy than GRU 2 and 3 in Table 4.5. The discriminator helps the generator better capture the dynamics of the transients, hence resulting in
higher classification accuracy. In summary, the HGAN-based model outperforms the other
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Table 4.4: TSA classification accuracy of the baseline methods and the HGAN-based TSA
with only one sample of PMU measurements (20 PMUs are used)
Method
Decision tree
SVM
LSTM
GRU
Stacked GRU
HGAN

TSA Classification Accuracy
99.5%
95.8%
94.75%
94.8%
99.1%
99.95%

Table 4.5: TSA classification accuracy (F1 score) of each GRU in the stacked GRU model

Accuracy

GRU 1
95.1 %

GRU 2
98.2 %

GRU 3
98.7 %

baseline methods from both the accuracy and applicability perspectives. It is noted that
the study in [114] developed a stacked-GRU model to classify transient events. However,
this stacked model is a multilayer GRU, where the higher level GRU uses the output of the
lower level GRU at the same time step. This stacked GRU model is the same as the studied
baseline GRU model in Table 4.4, where two layers of GRU is used. Moreover, this model
can only be used for classification, and requires at least several cycles of measurements to
achieve high TSA classification accuracy.

4.4.3

Impact of PMU Measurement Variations

The PMU measurements used in this section are obtained from simulations and are thus
noise free. However, in practice, PMU measurements are contaminated by noise. Hence,
the sensitivities of the HGAN-based TSA method to noisy PMU measurements are analyzed. Following the study in [137], and [138], white Gaussian noise is added to the simulated PMU data. Four different signal-to-noise ratios (SNR), namely, 50dB, 60dB, 70dB,
and 80dB, are considered. The classification accuracies of the HGAN-based method under
different noise conditions are presented in Fig. 4.10. The classification results in Fig. 4.10
show that the noise mainly affects the performance of GAN 1. Larger noise will lead to
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of response time between the baseline methods and HGAN-based
TSA method. In total, 20 PMUs are used in the IEEE 118-bus system. To achieve the
same accuracy as the HGAN-based method, other methods would use more samples of
PMU measurements and thus require longer response time.
a lower classification accuracy in GAN 1. However, it is observed that the classification
accuracy of GAN 2 and GAN 3 are above 99%, and are not impacted by the addition of
noise. Another interesting observation is that among the five different noise conditions,
GAN 1 achieves the highest classification accuracy when a noise of 80dB SNR is added
to the measurements. This accuracy is even higher than using clean PMU data. This observation can be explained by the known fact that adding a small noise to the input data
leads to a better performance of the GAN models, as they learn more general features of
the transient data for a better classification performance [139].
In practice, PMUs are not deployed on every bus. Hence, the performance of the HGANbased TSA varies by location. To evaluate the performance of the developed approach
under varying PMU placement scenarios, five different PMU placement scenarios are investigated. The PMU locations for these five scenarios are listed in Table 4.6. The classification accuracy for each GAN under these scenarios is depicted in Table 4.7. As seen, the
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Figure 4.10: The TSA classification accuracy of each sub-GAN under different noise conditions. The testing data are used for evaluation.
Table 4.6: PMU location scenarios for investigating the impact of PMU placement on the
developed TSA approach

Scenario
1
2
3
4
5

Location
5, 12, 15, 17, 37, 49, 59, 69, 71, 77, 80, 85, 92, 96, 100, 105
5, 12, 15, 17, 37, 56, 67, 69, 70, 71, 77, 80, 92, 96, 100, 105
5, 12, 15, 17, 37, 49, 67, 69, 70, 71, 77, 80, 92, 96, 100, 105
5, 12, 15, 17, 32, 37, 49, 56, 59, 71, 77, 80, 85, 92, 96, 100
5, 12, 15, 17, 32, 37, 49, 56, 59, 69, 71, 77, 80, 92, 96, 100

location of PMUs significantly impacts the classification performance of GAN1, where the
accuracy ranges from 94.55% to 97.9%. Benefiting from the predicted data, the impact of
placement is decreased in GAN2 and GAN3. Moreover, the classification accuracy slightly
drops in GAN 3, due to the accumulation of small prediction errors in lower GANs.
The impact of the number of PMUs is demonstrated in Table 4.8. Increasing the number
of PMUs improves the TSA accuracy for GAN1. At 12 and above PMUs, the classification
accuracy of GAN2 and 3 are around 99%. However, with less than 10 PMUs the classification accuracy of GAN2 and GAN3 drops, indicating that the predicted data from the lower
GANs are not close to real data. The prediction error propagates to higher GANs and
increases cumulative error, which degrades the classification accuracy. For example, with
8 PMUs, the classification accuracy is 91.15% in GAN2 and drops to 77.95% in GAN3.
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Table 4.7: The TSA classification accuracy of each GAN with different PMU locations.
The testing data are used for evaluation. A total number of 16 PMUs are used

PMU Location Scenario
1
2
3
4
5

TSA Classification Accuracy (%)
GAN 1 GAN 2
GAN 3
94.55
98.55
97.90
97.15
99.40
98.40
96.65
99.65
99.15
97.90
98.55
97.55
95.40
98.25
97.20

Table 4.8: TSA classification accuracy of each sub-GAN with different number of PMUs

Number of PMUs
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20

GAN 1
86.90%
91.20%
94.20%
95.75%
96.05%
96.65%
96.25%
95.35%

GAN 2
84.65%
91.15%
94.55%
99.60%
99.93%
99.65%
99.40%
99.95%

GAN 3
88.20%
77.95%
95.20%
99.65%
99.92%
99.15%
99.91%
99.95%

While more PMU data improve the classification accuracy, when the number of PMUs is
larger than a threshold, e.g., 12 in the IEEE 118-bus system, the classification accuracy
remains fixed in the higher level GANs.

4.5

Discussions

Examples of the predicted post-fault voltage time series for both stable and unstable
transients are shown in Fig. 4.11. The relative rotor angles of the stable and unstable transient events are shown in Fig. 4.11a and Fig. 4.11b, respectively. The HGANbased TSA has five GANs, and thus can predict the voltage of the subsequent five time
steps {v̂(2), · · · , v̂(6)}, using the measured post-fault voltage data v(1). As observed in
Fig. 4.11g and Fig. 4.11h, the average prediction errors for both stable and unstable transients are within 0.03 pu. By only using the measured PMU voltage data from the first
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time instant, i.e., v(1), the HGAN-based model predicts the oscillation features of these
two events, and for the most part, generates similar time series data as the real measurements. With the prediction capability, the developed approach can also be deployed in
other applications (e.g., predicting stability margins) that benefit from the ability to predict how transients progress. The prediction accuracy of the sequence data relies on the
performance of each sub-GAN. The error in lower level GANs propagates to higher level
GANs and results in a large accumulated error. To improve the prediction, we suggest: (1)
freezing the lower-level GANs when training the higher-level GANs to avoid overfitting;
(2) adding additional encoder and decoder to generator to better predict the sequence data.
The performance of the developed TSA approach naturally relies on the training data. As
the transient data are generated from simulations, the training dataset is ensured to be balanced, i.e, the number of stable and unstable transients is close. However, the real-world
transient training datasets are imbalanced, i.e., the ratio between the unstable and stable
events is less than 5%, since the unstable transient events are low-frequency events. An
imbalanced training dataset may adversely affect the classification accuracy. To address
the problem of imbalanced data, two strategies, i.e., data resampling and redesigning the
classifier algorithm, are suggested to improve the HGAN-based TSA method. The data
resampling methods, such as oversampling and undersampling methods, increase the ratio
between the two types of events [140]. In addition to resampling, the classifier algorithm
can be adjusted, such that it is more sensitive to unstable events. For instance, in [141],
the misclassification cost is modified such that a higher cost is assigned to the wrong prediction of the unstable events.
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Figure 4.11: Comparison between the real and predicted post-fault stable and unstable
transients. The developed TSA approach has 5 GANs and the number of PMUs is 20. The
PMU voltage measurements are normalized using a Min-Max scaling method.
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Figure 4.11: Comparison between the real and predicted post-fault stable and unstable
transients. The developed TSA approach has 5 GANs and the number of PMUs is 20. The
PMU voltage measurements are normalized using a Min-Max scaling method.

4.6

Conclusions

This section developed a novel GAN-based TSA approach to promptly and accurately
assess the post-fault transient status of a power system using PMU-provided voltage measurements. Unlike the conventional GAN model, the generator is redesigned such that
the modified GAN model predicts the sequence data from real-time measurements. Benefiting from the specific hierarchical structure of multiple GANs, the developed HGANbased model maintains the spatial and temporal features of the multivariate PMU time
series data. Therefore, with only one sample of PMU measurement, the developed TSA
approach improves the stability assessment accuracy. The ability to utilize only one sample of data to generate accurate predictions of future system transients is a significant
achievement compared to the conventional methods. Case studies conducted on the IEEE
118-bus system demonstrate that the TSA accuracy can reach 99.95%, specifically using
the predicted data. Compared with the other four machine-learning-based methods, i.e.,
decision trees, SVM, GRU, and LSTM, and the stacked GRU model, the HGAN-based
TSA achieves a higher classification accuracy and is faster. To demonstrate the robustness
of the HGAN-based TSA, the impacts of measurement noise, location, and the number
of available measurements are investigated. It is observed that the prediction capability
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of the HGAN-based TSA increases the robustness to these variations while improving the
classification accuracy. Following proper offline training, the developed TSA can be applied in near real-time to assess the post-fault stability of a power system. Additionally,
as the HGAN model enables learning the spatial and temporal features of the system transients, the predicted sequence data can be used for various applications that benefit from
the ability to predict the transient response of a system.
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Chapter 5
Impact Mitigation of Power System
Failures

5.1

Introduction

The aforementioned chapters have analyzed event detection and impact prediction. After
the event is detected, it is also critical to promptly mitigate failures, and prevent the propagation of cascades. This chapter is concerned with the optimal mitigation of the power
system failures, in particular, thermal overloads. With the large-scale adoption of phasor
measurement units, new and more effective mitigation opportunities have emerged. However, the possibility of false data attacks on the measured data, or the relay status information, threatens the promise of utilizing measurements for timely mitigation of thermal
overloads. False data can lead to the wrong estimation of the system states and the power
flow model, which may eventually lead to wrong mitigations. Authors in [2, 142–145]
have shown that malicious false data can be injected into PMU measurements through
various communication protocols such as IEC 61850 and IEC 60870-5-101, and remain
undetected.
To address these challenges, a data-driven model-predictive control (MPC) method is introduced for mitigation of the thermal overloads, which is resilient to false data injection attacks. This is achieved by constructing a data-driven power flow model from the
trustworthy system measurements, that is independent from system topology and model
parameters. Hence, the power flow model becomes immune to wrong system model infor-
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mation. Additionally, to eliminate the adverse impacts of false data on the measurements,
the actual system states are recovered from the historical trustworthy data if an attack is
detected.

5.2

Background

Various overload mitigation methods have been developed, which can be grouped into two
main categories of transmission line switching [146–148], and power re-dispatch methods [149–152]. Line switching methods are cost-effective, and mitigate overloads via
switching transmission lines and bus-bars. However, they are computationally burdensome. The power re-dispatch methods, solve a carefully formulated optimal power flow
(OPF) to identify feasible mitigations with a reasonable computational complexity. However, the open loop feature and the one-step ahead control actions limit the applicability of
these OPF based re-dispatch methods.
To address the limitations of the aforementioned methods, MPC has been utilized as an
alternative approach to identify optimal control actions. MPC has been applied in power
systems for various purposes, such as voltage control [153, 154], frequency control [155,
156], and overload mitigation [157–162]. Unlike the conventional one-step ahead controls,
MPC-based controllers determine the optimal actions based on projections of their impact
on the proceeding finite time-steps [163]. The optimization process is repeated for the
subsequent time steps to identify the corresponding corrective actions based on the actual
system conditions. With a closed-loop feedback feature, MPC can handle unexpected
system operating conditions and measurement noise [157].
The MPC-based overload mitigation strategies developed in [157,158] are improved in [159]
by considering the temperature limits of the lines, which lead to dynamic line ratings. Dynamic line ratings more accurately reflect thermal constraints than the static line ratings.
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The MPC-based overload mitigation methods are further expanded in [160–162], utilizing other types of controllable resources, such as energy storage and distributed energy
resources.

5.3
5.3.1

Power Flow Model
Model-based Linear DC Power Flow Model

The model-based DC power flow model is linear and computationally efficient in identifying optimal mitigative actions with the MPC method [161]. For a power system with
Nbus buses and Nline lines, three assumptions are made in a DC power flow model [164]:
1) line resistances are neglected; 2) all bus voltage magnitudes are one per unit; 3) the
phase angels of the two neighboring buses are close. Under these assumptions, the relationship between the active power flow of lines and the active power injection at buses can
be described by a power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) matrix Ψ ∈ RNline ×Nbus as,
h
i
T
−1
Ψ = O, B Ã(Ã B Ã)
,

(5.1)

where O ∈ RNline is an all zeros column vector. The matrix B is a diagonal susceptance
matrix, where Bii = bi and bi is the susceptance of line i. The matrix Ã ∈ RNline ×(Nbus −1) is
a reduced-sized incidence matrix of a power system, which is obtained from the incidence
matrix A ∈ RNline ×Nbus by removing the column that corresponds to the slack bus. Given
the system topology information, the edge-to-node incidence matrix A is obtained as,



1 If bus j is the f rom bus in line i



Aij = −1
If bus j is the to bus in line i .




0
otherwise

(5.2)
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The relationship between the active power flow of line i and active power injections at all
buses is [165],
P fi = Ψi · P inj, ∀i ∈ {Lines},

(5.3)

Given equation (5.3), a linear DC power flow model can be formulated as a linear time
invariant (LTI) system [166]. To match the sampling time of the system meters, the LTI
system is first discretized as,

P fi [k + 1] = P fi [k] + Ψi · ∆P inj[k]

(5.4.1)

P fimea [k] = P fi [k] + εi [k], ∀i ∈ {Lines},

(5.4.2)

where the power injection change at time k, ∆P inj[k] ∈ RNbus , is defined as,
load
∆P inj[k] = Agen
bus ∆G[k] − Abus ∆D[k],

(5.5)

load
th
The entry in the ith row and j th column of Agen
bus (Abus ) is one, if the j generator (load) is

located at bus i, and zero otherwise. The input to the LTI system in (5.6) is the active power
injection change ∆P inj ∈ RNbus , and the output is the power flow of line i, P fimea , ∀i ∈
{Lines}. For brevity, we use P fi to denote the output of the LTI system for the rest of this
chapter. The LTI system in (5.6) is controllable as the controlability matrix Ω = Ψi , has a
full row rank [167]. Furthermore, incorporating (5.5) into this LTI system can lead to:


P f [k + 1]


 G[k + 1]  =




D[k + 1]



gen

load 
Ψ · Abus −Ψ · Abus 


∆G[k]

 I


O
g
d



 ∆D[k] + ∆Dvar [k]
Og
Id


 

1
P f [k] epf [k]

 

 +  e1 [k] 
+
G[k]

  g 

 

D[k]
e1d [k]

(5.6.1)
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mea
2
P f [k] P f [k] epf [k]

 
 

 Gmea [k]  =  G[k]  +  e2 [k] 

 
  g 

 
 

Dmea [k]
D[k]
e2d [k]

(5.6.2)

where Ig ∈ RNgen ×Ngen and Id ∈ RNload ×Nload are identity matrices. Og ∈ RNgen ×Ngen and
Od ∈ RNload ×Nload are zero matrices. P f mea [k], Gmea [k] and Dmea [k] are the measured
power flow, generation, and load at time k, respectively. The vectors e1pf , e1g , e1d and e2pf ,
e2g , e2d are the noise vectors, due to load prediction and metering errors, for the LTI system.

5.3.2

Parameter-based Power Flow Model

The previous section introduces the model-based power flow. It can be observed in (5.6)
that the model-based linear power flow model requires accurate system model information. An error in the topology processor can lead to a wrong incidence matrix A or a
wrong susceptance matrix B. As a result, an incorrect PTDF matrix Ψ is achieved, which
in turn leads to a wrong estimation of the impacts of power injection changes on line
power flows. To address the problem in conventional model-based power flow, a datadriven power flow model is developed, which is illustrated in Fig. 5.1. For the discrete
LTI system described in (5.6), the input column vector at time k, which is the change of
the power injection, is defined as ∆P inj(k) = [∆P inj1 (k), · · · , ∆P injNbus (k)]T . Given
−1
a sequence of the input vectors from time zero to N − 1, i.e., {∆P inj(u)}N
u=0 , these se-

quence input vectors, i.e., input trajectory, can be represented as a stacked column vector
∆P inj[0,N −1] = [∆P inj T (0), · · · , ∆P inj T (N − 1)]T .
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Figure 5.1: The developed data-driven power flow model

Assume the length of the prediction horizon and the input data are L and N (N ≥ L),
respectively. Then, the Hankel matrix of this trajectory is,

HL ∆P inj[0,N −1] =




∆P inj(1) · · ·
∆P inj(N − L) 
 ∆P inj(0)




 ∆P inj(1)
∆P inj(2) · · · ∆P inj(N − L + 1).




..
..
..
...


.
.
.




∆P inj(L − 1) ∆P inj(L) · · ·
∆P inj(N − 1)

(5.7)

If the Hankel matrix has a full row rank, the stored data in HL can be used to learn the
power flow model [168]. In other words, in order for the rows of the Hankel matrix to
−1
be independent (full rank), the sequence {∆P inju }N
u=0 should be sufficiently long and

rich [168], which implies that N ≥ 2L − 1.
Lemma 1 Given the observed input-output sequences of the LTI system described in (5.6),
N −1
i.e. {∆P inj(u), P fi (u)}u=0
, the sequence {∆P inj(v), P f i (v)}L−1
v=0 is also the trajec-

tory of the same system if and only if there exists an α ∈ RN −L+1 such that,








HL (∆P inj[0,N −1] )
∆P inj [0,L−1] 

α = 
.
HL (P fi, [0,N −1] )

P f i, [0,L−1]

(5.8)
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Lemma 1, which is proven for an LTI system in [168], is extended to the problem considered here. It indicates that, for an unknown LTI system, any L−long system trajectory can
be represented by the observed data, which is the foundation of the developed data-driven
power flow model.
It can be found in Lemma 1 that, in comparison with the parametric data-driven system identification methods that require additional steps to calculate system state, input
and output matrices, this non-parametric method deploys the Hankel matrix to represent the system model directly using the system data. Lemma 1 requires the length of
−1
the data sequence {∆P inj(u), P fi (u)}N
u=0 to be large enough to meet the constraint:

N ≥ Nbus (L + 1) + L.
From (5.8) the output trajectory P f i, [0,L−1] can be computed by first solving HL (∆P i
nj[0,N −1] )α = ∆P inj [0,L−1] for α, and then solving P f i, [0,L−1] = HL (P fi, [0,N −1] )α. To
further estimate the impact of the power injection changes on a specific power flow,
the initial condition of the power flow {P f i (v)}L−1
v=0 , which is the first Nini data points
ini −1
{P f i (v)}N
v=0 , has to be specified [169]. The Hankel matrices of the observed input-

output trajectories HL (∆P inj) and HL (P fi ), after defining the length of the initial trajecf
T
tory Nini , can then be partitioned as HNini +Nf (∆P inj) = [Hini
Nini (∆P inj), HNf (∆P inj)]
f
T
and HNini +Nf (P f ) = [Hini
Nini (P fi ), HNf (P fi )] .

Lemma 2 Given: (a) the observed input-output trajectories of a power system, i.e., {∆
ini

ini

Nini −1
−1
P inj(u), P fi (u)}N
u=0 ; (b) the initial condition of the system {∆P inj (u), P f i (u)}u=0 ;
f

N −1

f
and (c) the future power injection change {∆P inj (u)}u=0
, if the Hankel matrix of the

input trajectory ∆P inj[0,N −1] has full row rank of Nini + Nf + 1 and Nini ≥ 1, there exists
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an α ∈ RN −Nini −Nf +1 such that,




ini
ini
∆P inj [0,Nini −1] 
HNini (∆P inj)




.
 Hf (∆P inj)  α =  ∆P inj f


 Nf
[0,Nf −1] 




ini
ini
HNini (P fi )
P f i, [0,Nini −1]

(5.9)

f

N −1

f
The power flow of line i, due to the power injection change {∆P inj (u)}u=0
, can then

f

be estimated as P f i, [0,Nf −1] = HfNf (P fi ) · α.
Lemma 2 is proven in [169] for LTI systems. Here, it is extended to the data-driven power
flow model so that with the initial input-output trajectory, the future trajectory is uniquely
determined. Due to the presence of measurement noise, and because equation (5.9) is an
under-determined equation, α can be obtained via regularized least square method,
α = (HTini−f Hini−f + µI)−1 HTini−f Dini−f .

(5.10)
ini

f
ini
T
where Hini−f = [Hini
Nini (∆P inj), HNf (∆P inj), HNini (P f )] and Dini−f = [∆P inj , ∆
f

f

P inj , P f i ]T are the Hankel matrix and the data vector in (5.9), respectively. Lemma 2
and (5.10) demonstrate how the power flows can be obtained from the measurements, regardless of the system topology information or transmission line parameter errors. In this
chapter, this data-driven power flow model is leveraged to determine proper overload mitigations, and amend malicious data using stored trustworthy data. Note that, it is assumed
that the stored historical PMU data have been validated by an attack detection method and
are thus trustworthy.

5.4

Recovery-based Model-driven MPC model

A model predictive cascade mitigation methodology is developed in this section to optimize the controls over a finite time horizon, starting from the current time instant k. Unlike
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the conventional control methods, MPC method enables handling all system constraints,
e.g. power flow and generation limits, and incorporates the evolution of the system state to
decide on control actions [163]. Thus, based on the predicted system state at time instant k,
an RMPC model is formulated to eliminate the system violations once system component
failures are detected. Additionally, the RMPC model is further improved by addressing
the issue of detection delays caused by the data anomaly detection methods.

5.4.1

State Recovery

When the state of system variables at time k, is detected to be incorrect due to cyberphysical attacks, the historical trustworthy data of the system will be utilized to recover
the compromised state variables. This concept, referred to as physical state recovery, rolls
the state of the system forward to the time instant k, starting from a stored state at time
instant k-N [170]. Instead of using the wrong states at time k, the states are predicted by
using the historical stored data between time instant k-N to k. Given the stored data at time
k-N and changes of the power injections from time k-N to k − 1, the power flow of lines
can be predicted as,
Pcf [k] = Pff [k − N ] +

N
X
i=1

P T DF · ∆P inj[k − i] +

N
X
i=1

e1pf [k − i]

(5.11)

where Pcf [k] is the predicted power flow at time k using historical data. The trustworthy
state Pff [k−N ] is estimated from the measured power flow at time k-N, i.e. P f mea [k−N ].
It can be observed that the prediction error increases with the length of the prediction
horizon N. Larger prediction horizon N would lead to a less accurate predicted power
flow at time k. After predicting the power flows, the incorrect states are replaced with
the predicted states. Assume at time k, Nattack number of power flows are detected
as compromised states. Thus, the system states at time k can be divided into two sets
of states, i.e., attacked states Pf attack [k] = {P f1attack [k], ..., P fNattack
[k]} and trusted
attack
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trust

states Pf trust [k] = {Pff 1

trust
[k], ..., Pff Nbranch −Nattack [k]}. With the state recovery (5.11),

the incorrect power flows are replaced with predicted results, denoted as Pf predict =
}. The power flow states that are used for deciding control actions
{P f1predict , ..., P fNpredict
attack
are thus represented as Pf amend [k] = {Pf trust [k] ∪ Pf predict [k]}. With same state recovery process, the amended state of load can be obtained and is represented as Damend [k] =
{Dtrust [k] ∪ Dpredict [k]}. Note that, as explained in [2], the generation measurements are
assumed to be non-attackable due to the strict security measures present. It is also assumed
that the historical input data, i.e. ∆P inj between time k-N to k-1 and the system state at
time k-N have already passed attack data detection process and are safely stored.

5.4.2

RMPC Model Construction

The RMPC model determines the control actions by solving the optimization problem presented in (5.12) over a finite time horizon, where the initial system states are obtained from
the predicted states using (5.11) if data anomalies are detected. Based on the constructed
LTI model in (5.6), RMPC predicts the evolution of power system states over time, and
thus can optimize the control action sequence in a desired prediction horizon. Given the
length of the prediction horizon N RM P C , the RMPC formulation is defined as follows,

Minimize

∆G[l], ∆D[l]

PC
N RM
X −1

l=0

(∆GT [l] · R · ∆G[l]

(5.12.1)

+∆DT [l] · Q · ∆D[l] + ∆S T [l] · SL · ∆S[l]
s.t.
P f [l + 1] = P f [l] + P T DF · ∆P inj[l]

(5.12.2)

Gg [l + 1] = Gg [l] + ∆Gg [l]

(5.12.3)

Dd [l + 1] = Dd [l] + ∆Dd [l] + ∆Ddvar [l]

(5.12.4)

Ngen

X
g=1

Gg (l + 1) −

N
load
X
d=1

Dd (l + 1) = 0

(5.12.5)
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P f [l] ≤ P f max + S[l]
S[l] ≥ 0

(5.12.6)
(5.12.7)

≤ ∆Gg [l] ≤ Gup
− Gdown
g
g

(5.12.8)

Gmin
≤ Gg [l] ≤ Gmax
g
g

(5.12.9)

0 ≤ ∆Dd [l] ≤ Ddshed

(5.12.10)

l
X

∆Dd [t] ≤ Ddshed

(5.12.11)

|P f [N RM P C ]|≤ P f max

(5.12.12)

t=0

where ∆G[l] ∈ RNgen and ∆D[l] ∈ RNload are the generation ramping and load shedding
control actions at the prediction time instant l. Ngen and Nload are the number of generators
and loads. The weight matrices R ∈ RNgen ×Ngen and Q ∈ RNload ×Nload are used to penalize
the generation ramping and load shedding, respectively. To obtain a feasible solution from
the optimization problem in (5.12), the slack variable S[l] ∈ RNbranch is introduced to
convert the hard constraint of line power flows, i.e. |P f [l]|≤ P f max , into a soft constraint,
that is, |P f [l]|≤ P f max + S[l], where the slack variable is non-negative and is penalized
in the objective. The rational for using the slack variables is that, when the power flow of a
transmission line is above but is not far from its limit, this line can withstand the overloads
for a short duration of time. The penalty weight matrix is SL ∈ RNbranch ×Nbranch , where
Nbranch is the number of the transmission lines. P f max is the maximum capacity of the
lines. The load variation at time l is represented as ∆Ddvar [l]. The power injection change
at prediction time l is the combination of generation ramping, load shedding and load
variation, where the power injection at bus n can be computed by solving (5.5). Gdown
g
th
and Gup
generator. The maximum and
g are the ramping down and up limits for the g

minimum generation of the g th generator are denoted as Gmax
and Gmin
. Since some of
g
g
the loads are critical (e.g. hospitals) and cannot be shed, we assume partial load shedding.
Thus, the amount of available load that can be shed at dth load is represented as Ddshed .
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The objective of the RMPC model (5.13.1) is to minimize the total cost of the control
actions and the slack variables over the finite time horizon [k, k + N RM P C ]. The constraints (5.13.2)-(5.12.4) calculate the the power flow, generation and load at the prediction
time l+1. The supply and demand balance at each prediction time instant is guaranteed
in (5.12.5). The constraint of power flow is converted to a soft constraint by introducing
the slack variable S and is given in (5.13.3). The non-negative constraint of slack variable
is given in (5.12.7). The limitations of generation ramping and load shedding are given
in (5.12.8) and (5.12.10), and the generation limit of a generator is guaranteed in (5.12.9).
The constraint (5.12.11) is to guarantee the total load lost in a load bus is within its maximum limit. The terminal constraint (5.13.4) is used to guarantee that all overloads are
eliminated at the end of the prediction time.
After obtaining the control actions for a prediction horizon, only the first step of the optimized actions is applied as a control action, while the entire process is repeated to find the
control actions for the next time step. In this section, the control actions are load shedding
and generation ramping up/down, and the objective of the RMPC is to eliminate system
limit violations, in particular, transmission line overloads. The steps of the developed
RMPC scheme are as follows,
Step 1

e and D[k]
e from the measured data.
At time k, estimate system variables Pff [k], G[k]
If the estimated variables pass the attack detection method, set the states at time k
e
e
as Pf initial [k] = Pff [k], Ginitial [k] = G[k],
Dinitial [k] = D[k]
and go to step 3;
otherwise, go to step 2;

Step 2

Deploying (5.11), the historical trustworthy power injection changes ∆P inj[k −
i], i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }, and the system state at time instant k-N, to amend wrong system
states at time instant k. After recovering the system states at time k, set the system
states as Pf initial [k] = Pf amend [k], Dinitial [k] = Damend [k] and go to step 3;
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Step 3

With the initial states Pf initial [k], Ginitial [k] and Dinitial [k], solve the MPC optimization problem (5.12) over a defined prediction horizon [k, k + N RM P C ] and obtain the optimized control actions, i.e., ∆G[l|k], ∆D[l|k], l ∈ {0, 1, ..., N RM P C −
1}, where ∆G[l|k] and ∆D[l|k] denote the generation ramping up/down and load
shedding at the prediction time instant k+l. For simplicity, we use ∆G[l] and ∆D[l]
to denote ∆G[l|k] and ∆D[l|k];

Step 4

Apply the first obtained control action, that is, ∆G[0] and ∆D[0];

Step 5

Set k = k + 1 and back to step 1.

5.4.3

Improving RMPC Scheme with Checkpointing Protocol

The aforementioned RMPC method assumes that the lag between the injection and the
detection of an attack data is negligible. However, the detection delays should be taken
into consideration [142, 171]. The reason for considering detection delays is because the
use of the states that are received during delay interval may lead to a wrong control actions.
To address the issue of the detection delays, based on a checkpointing protocol developed
in [170], an RMPC scheme is developed to determine optimal cascade mitigation actions
under the impacts of cyber-physical attacks and the attack detection delays. The strategy of
the checkpointing protocol is illustrated in Fig. 5.6. Assume the attack detection method
uses the latest received data of length N , i.e., from time k-N+1 to the current time k,
to determine the attacks. If the detection method clears the examined data, the cascade
mitigation actions can be determined based on the measured data at time k. However,
if the examined data is found to be untrustworthy, this latest collected data of length N
cannot be used anymore as it is hard to identify the exact attack injection time. To address
this challenge, the trustworthy stored data at time instant k − N are used to first recover
the state at time k, and then proper control actions are identified. The stored correct system
state at time instant k − N is referred to as a checkpoint, that are prepared for system state
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Figure 5.2: Checkpointing protocol illustration in handling attack detection delays
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Figure 5.3: The RMPC architecture for mitigating cascades following a CCPA
recovery if an attack is detected. For the next time instant k + 1, the stored states at time
k − N + 1 would be updated as a new checkpoint and the previous checkpoint at time
k − N is discarded. The architecture of the RMPC scheme is given in Fig. 5.3. Power
system meters such as PMUs continue to measure the states of system variables, while
the measured data is examined through an attack detector. If the measured data is deemed
clear of any anomalies, the estimated system states will be sent to MPC controller and
used to update the stored checkpoints. On the other hand, if the measured data is reported
compromised, the state recovery process will be activated to use the historical data to
predict the real-time system state, that in turn is sent to MPC to determine optimized
control actions ∆P and ∆D. Note that the state recovery error is assumed to be smaller
than the user defined maximum tolerance. If the recovery error is above the tolerance, the
system may need to restore the tampered meters.
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5.5

Recovery-based Data-driven MPC Model

5.5.1

Overview of the MPC Controller

The architecture of the developed recovery-based data-driven MPC (RD-MPC) is illustrated in Fig. 5.4. The specific type of attack considered in this chapter is an attack in
which system states are altered. The system operating conditions are measured and transmitted to the control centers by PMUs or SCADA measurements. A malicious false data
attack can potentially bypass bad data detection mechanisms and change the system states
by altering relay status or tampering multiple measurements [172, 173], leading to wrong
control actions that further aggravate system conditions. For example, during a FDIA, an
attacker can disrupt the power flows (by means such as phase shifting transformer (PST)
attacks), and at the same time inject false data to conceal the disruption. Thus, instead of
directly using the measured data to determine the mitigative actions, the received data are
first examined by an attack detector.
Data-driven MPC
Attacker

Power
System

∆
∆!

Optimizer

System
State

Data-driven
Power flow

Measurement

Attack
Detector

Attack
alert
No
attack

Safe Device

Recover

Checkpoint

Figure 5.4: RD-MPC architecture for mitigating thermal overloads after a FDIA

Here, the attack detection method in Chapter 2 is leveraged, in which text mining methods
are used to promptly identify tampered PMU measurements. Note that while only one
type of attack detection is considered in this study, other attack detection methods can also
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be deployed. However, attack detection is outside the scope of this study. Hence, a previously developed method is used. If the measurements do not exhibit malicious data, they
are deemed safe to be used by the data-driven MPC controller to determine the optimal
control actions. These correct measurements are also used to update the stored checkpoint,
i.e., trustworthy historical data. However, if an attack detector indicates the existence of
false data, the state recovery process will be triggered to use the stored checkpoint to estimate the actual system states. With these recovered system states, the data-driven MPC
controller determines the corresponding optimal mitigative actions.

5.5.2

Construction of the Data-driven MPC Model

The data-driven MPC method utilizes the measurement-based power flow model that was
described in the previous section. The aim is to identify optimal mitigative actions over
a finite time horizon. Three model information are required to construct the data-driven
controller: (1) the length of the prediction horizon N MPC ; (2) the measured system inputoutput trajectories ∆P inj[0,N −1] and P fi, [0,N −1] ; and (3) the system operating conditions
represented by ∆P inj(0), P f (0). The developed new data-driven MPC formulation for
alleviating the overloads is formulated as,

Minimize

∆G[k], ∆D[k]

MPC −1
NX

k=0

(∆GT [k] · M · ∆G[k] + ∆DT [k] · Q · ∆D[k]

+S T [k] · SL · S[k] +

Nline
X
i=1

s.t. ∀k ∈ {0, 1, ..., N MPC }, ∀i ∈ {Lines}




(5.13.1)
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P f [k] ≤ P f max + S[k]

(5.13.3)

|P f [N MPC ]|≤ P f max

(5.13.4)

where P f i, [1,N MPC ] is the power flow of line i over the next predicted N MPC time steps.
The weight matrices M ∈ RNgen ×Ngen and Q ∈ RNload ×Nload penalize generation ramping
and load shedding. The slack variable vector S ∈ RNline converts the power flow limits,
i.e. |P f [k]|≤ P f max , into soft constraints such that feasible solutions are obtained. The
penalty weight matrix for the slack variable is SL ∈ RNline ×Nline . A transmission line
can withstand a slight overload for a short time, which is the rational for using the slack
variable S.
With the objective function of the MPC formulation in (5.13.1), the cost of generation
ramping and load shedding is minimized. The data-driven power flow model of each
transmission line is formulated in (5.13.2), and the four Hankel matrices explained in
Lemma 2 are constructed with Ninitial = 1 and Nf = N MPC . The terminal constraint
(5.13.4) guarantees that all line power flows below their limits at the end of the prediction
horizon [174]. Other constraints of control actions, load and generators can be found in a
previous study [175].

5.5.3

Reducing Computational Time

The data-driven MPC determines the optimal actions in multiple future time steps. As seen
in (5.13), the developed controller considers a large set of variables (e.g., S, ∆G and ∆D
for all the generators and controllable loads) and constraints. This drawback is addressed
by decreasing the number of variables and constraints before employing the data-driven
MPC. Two strategies are developed to achieve this goal: 1) effectively limiting the control
actions, and 2) identifying a smaller set of controlled lines.
The first strategy is to reduce the control action space, i.e. generation ramping and load
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shedding while keeping the ability to control the overloads intact. As indicated by other
studies, only the actions taken on a subset of generators or loads have a significant impact
on the power flow of a particular line [176]. This is also corroborated by the PTDF matrix,
where some elements are zero or close to zero. Thus, it is suggested in the literature that
the location of the sparse elements of the PTDF matrix can be used to reduce the number
of control actions [162]. However, the PTDF matrix might be erroneous due to topology
processor errors. This problem is addressed by developing an alternative method to using
the PTDF matrix, i.e., the buses with reduced control actions are directly determined via
system measurements. To specify the location of the controlled buses in a time more
suitable for online applications, the formulation in (5.13) is simplified by setting N MPC to
one, which results in a more aggressive mitigation strategy that aims to alleviate overloads
in only one time step. The objective is to reduce the number of control actions. Hence, the
zero norm of the control vector is minimized, while characteristics such as the data-driven
power flow model, and power flow limits are retained,

T

Minimize v Cv + ρ1 ∥v∥0 +
v

Nline
X
i=1

ρ2 ∥gi ∥22

s.t. ∀i ∈ {Lines}




ini
HNini (∆P inj)
 v 




 Hini (P f )  gi = P f (0)
i


 i 
Nini




HfNf (P fi )
P fi (1)
∥P f (1)∥<= P f max
Nbus
X

v(j) = 0

(5.14.1)

(5.14.2)

(5.14.3)
(5.14.4)

j=1

vmin ≤ v ≤ vmax

(5.14.5)

where v ∈ RNbus is the control action vector, and C ∈ RNbus ×Nbus is the control action
cost at each bus. The penalty parameter ρ1 determines the number of the selected control
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actions, and ρ2 is the regularization parameter. The objective of (5.14.1) is to minimize the
cost of control actions and the number of non-zero elements (via zero norm ) in the control
vector v. The formulation described in (5.14.1) is non-convex, due to existence of the l0 norm. Hence, the l0 -norm is relaxed using a l1 -norm, which yields a convex optimization
problem,
Minimize v T Cv + ρ1 ∥v∥1 +
v

Nline
X
i=1

ρ2 ∥gi ∥22 .

(5.15)

An example solution to (5.14) for the IEEE 14-bus system is given in Fig. 5.5. It is seen
that, instead of taking actions at all buses to control the power flow, the selected control
actions are in vicinity of the regulated line2−4 . The control action reduction problem
can be viewed as a simplified data-driven MPC where N MPC = 1. The solution to this
selection problem identifies the location and the number of the control actions as well as
the approximate power flows after taking the control actions. With this approximate power
flow, the second time reduction strategy is introduced to further reduce the computation
time.

13
12

11
10

6
1
G

14
9

5

G

7

G

4

Regulated line

3

2
G

8

G

Selected buses

Figure 5.5: Example of a control action reduction for the IEEE 14-bus system. In order
to regulate line2−4 , control actions are applied to buses 1, 3, 4 and 8. The parameters in
(5.14) are ρ1 = 5 and ρ2 = 0.1.
The second strategy is to reduce the number of controlled lines in (5.13.2). The power
flows of many lines are far from their maximum limits, and stay within their limits after
taking control actions. Hence, excluding these lines from the MPC calculations would not
affect the results of the data-driven MPC, while significantly improving the computation
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time. The approximate line power flows, after applying the predicted control actions from
(5.14), are used to determine the lines that can be eliminated. The rational is that, if the
line power flows are less than their limits after taking the aggressive mitigative actions
from (5.14), these lines will also be within the limits when taking the moderate actions
from (5.13). With the obtained power flows of all lines from (5.14), a line i with a power
flow of smaller than γ · P fimax can be eliminated when solving (5.13). The parameter
γ is used to control the number of the selected lines. Larger γ can result in fewer controlled lines in (5.13), however, the unexpected overloads during MPC prediction maybe
neglected.

5.5.4

Improving Attack-resiliency

Attack resiliency of the developed method can be improved by recovering the wrong states
at time k from the stored trustworthy data at time k − Nd . By extending the state recovery
method in [175] to the data-driven power flow model, the system states are rolled forward
to the present states at time instant k from the past correct system states at time k − Nd .
Specifically, given the stored control actions, i.e. ∆G and ∆D, during time k − Nd to k,
the corresponding power injection changes {∆P inj(t)}kt=k−Nd can be computed. Hence,
given the stored trustworthy system state at time k − Nd , i.e., P f trust (k − Nd ), the power
flow at time k can be estimated with the developed data-driven power flow model, that in
turn can be used to amend the wrong states at time k.
The state recovery concept recovers the attacked system states. However, the FDIA detection delays are not taken into consideration. Conventional detection methods use a
sequence of received data to detect malicious attacks. During the attack detection window, the received data sequence cannot yet be used to recover any wrong states, as their
trustworthiness still needs to be verified. The duration of this data sequence within the
detection window is referred to as a detection delay. When an attack is detected within
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a detection window, it is impractical to determine at what point in time the attack is injected. Thus, utilizing the data within the detection window may not correctly recover the
actual system states. To address the detection delays, the checkpointing protocol inspired
by [170], and depicted in Fig. 5.6, is extended here. An attack detection methodology such
as [136] determines if the received data between time instants k − Nd + 1 to k, referred to
as attack detection data, are maliciously modified. The attack detection data are pending
to be stored, and thus are not yet trustworthy. The trustworthy data at time k − Nd , is
referred to as a checkpoint, and is securely stored. If any attacks are identified, the stored
checkpoint would be used to recover the actual system states at time k. If no attacks are
detected, the measured data at time k are used to identify mitigations, and replace the previously stored checkpoint. The deleted data, are the previously stored checkpoints that are
no longer needed for the state recovery. Since the focus of this chapter is to develop an effective recovery protocol instead of an attack detection method, our previously developed
attack detection model in [136] is utilized to detect the attack.
Attack alert
Deleted
data

Attack
Detection
Data

Checkpoint

Data flow

Recover

Checkpoint
protocol

Input Data

No attack

Figure 5.6: The Checkpointing protocol for addressing the attack detection delays

5.6

Simulation Results

The developed RD-MPC is tested on IEEE 30-bus, IEEE 118-bus and Illinois 200-bus
systems. The performance of the data-driven MPC when mitigating overloads is first compared to the model-based MPC. The performance of the data-driven MPC with noisy measurements is also evaluated. Next, the RD-MPC is evaluated under a false data attack, to
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demonstrate its resiliency to attacks. For these studies, it is assumed that all transmission
lines are observed by PMUs.

5.6.1

Scenario Setup

1. PMU data generation
PMU time-series data, in particular, bus voltages and line currents, are simulated via
MATPOWER toolbox [177]. At each sampling instant m, the load at bus i, with a load
fluctuation of ω and a PMU measurement noise of ϵi , is denoted by,
Di [m] = (1 + ω)Di0 + ϵi ,

(5.16)

where Di [m] and Di0 refer to the load at bus i, at instant m and the nominal value,
respectively. Given the load profile at each time instant, the voltage and generation at
each bus, and the transmission line currents can be calculated via an AC power flow
model. Thus, the bus active power injections at each time step can be obtained, and
the power flow of lines can be obtained from PMU-measured bus voltages and line
currents. Without loss of generality, and inspired by [165, 178], it is assumed that ω
and ϵ follow a normal distribution with a zero mean and a standard deviation of 0.1 and
0.01, for ω and ϵ respectively. However, other distributions are expected to yield the
same results sought in this chapter. The sampling frequency of the PMUs is 60 frames
per second.
2. Attack Strategy
In this study, two different coordinated attacks are considered. To demonstrate the
effectiveness of the RD-MPC against wrong model information, a coordinated attack
that causes line overloads and fake outages (by PST physical attack and relay status
attack), is simulated in three different test systems. These coordinated attacks are illustrated in Table 5.1. Fake outages are created by injecting fake relay data to change
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the status of lines. The RD-MPC is further evaluated with another type of coordinated
attack in IEEE 118-bus system. The physical attack results in the overloads on lines 22,
28, while the overload on line 22 is concealed by tampering the power flow and load
measurements.
Table 5.1: Details of the coordinated attack scenarios
Test System

Objective
Fake outage

IEEE 30-bus
of line 27

Strategy
PST physical attack
(lines 10, 22, 35 overloaded)
relay attack

Relay
attack

Fake outage
IEEE 118-bus
of line 28

PST physical attack
(lines 22, 26 overloaded)
relay attack

Fake outage
Illinois 200-bus
of line 54

PST physical attack
(lines 27, 54 overloaded)
relay attack

Measurement

Conceal overload
IEEE 118-bus

attack

line 22

PST physical attack
(lines 22, 26 overloaded)
Tamper measurements
P f22 , D16 , D17

5.6.2

Model Parameter Setup

The matrices containing the weights of the objective function in formulations described in
(5.13), namely, M, Q and SL, are defined as M = Ig ×ωg , Q = Id ×ωd and SL = Is ×ωs ,
where Ig , Id and Is are identity matrices with proper dimensions. Since the ramping costs
of the generators are not known, the cost curve parameter of the quadratic term, i.e. ai ,
in the quadratic cost function (Cost(Gi ) = ai G2i + bi Gi ) is used for setting generator
ramping weights. The normalized weight for the ith generator, i.e. ωg (i) is defined as:
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max{0.1, maxaii{ai } } [161]. The value 0.1 is used to avoid the zero weight due to the fact
that the ai parameters of some generators may be zero. The ramp rate (MW/min) of the
generators is modeled as 10% of their capacity [179]. If generator ramping is not enough
to mitigate the overloads within the MPC time frame, load shedding will alleviate the
remaining overloads as a last resort. Since load shedding is the last resort among all the
control actions, the weights of ωd are all set to 100. The weights of the slack variables
S are set to 1000 to minimize the impact of the introduced soft constraints in (5.13.3).
The regularization parameters µ in (5.13.1) and ρ2 in (5.14.1) are set to 0.01 to reduce the
impacts of the measurement noise [180].
Since the transmission lines can withstand thermal overloads for a short duration [181],
the length of RD-MPC sampling time is set to 60 seconds. To match the sampling frequency of the RD-MPC with the generated PMU data and construct the historical inputoutput trajectory {∆P inj[0,N −1] , P f[0,N −1] }, the voltage and current PMU measurements
are sampled every 60 seconds from the simulated PMU time-series data. The length of
the prediction horizon N MPC is set to five minutes. The shorter the prediction time is, the
faster the overloads are alleviated. However, the cost for the control actions increases.
The regularization parameter ρ1 , used for controlling the sparsity of the control action
vector v in (5.15), is set to one. Larger ρ1 may lead to a more sparse control vector, i.e.
fewer control actions. However, the obtained control actions may lead to infeasible RDMPC solutions, i.e. fewer control actions are insufficient for mitigating the overloads. In
addition to the control action selection strategy, the parameter γ from the second computation reduction method is set to 0.9 to avoid missing line overloads. When the line
power flows, obtained from (5.14), are smaller than 0.9P f max , they are not considered
when solving RD-MPC. Large values of γ result in fewer lines being selected. However,
some overloads may be missed. With the aforementioned linear power flow assumptions
in Section 5.3.2, and the fact that in real power systems |Iij |≈ |Pij |, the use of active power
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for overload mitigation is justified [182].

5.6.3

RD-MPC against Wrong Topology

The developed data-driven MPC is evaluated on IEEE 30-bus, IEEE 118-bus and Illinois
200-bus systems. To satisfy the conditions of Lemma 2, i.e., N ≥ (Nbus + 1)N MPC + Nbus ,
the length of the historical input-output trajectory for these three systems are set to 500,
800, and 1300, respectively. Given the overload mitigation scenarios in Table 5.2, the
computation reduction strategies are first implemented to limit the considered number of
constraints and variables. The number of selected control actions and the regulated lines
from the developed data-driven MPC for each test system are given in Table 5.2. Compared
to the total numbers, the number of control actions and lines are significantly reduced.
Table 5.2: Thermal overload mitigation scenarios, the optimal number of control actions,
and the selected lines for three systems
Test Systems

IEEE 30-bus

IEEE 118-bus

Illinois 200-bus

System

System

System

Regulated Line

10

22

35

22

26

27

54

Actual Electric Current (pu)

0.325

0186

0.169

0.25

0.135

0.926

0.515

Desired Current (pu)

0.32

0.16

0.16

0.20

0.10

0.90

0.47

Number of selected controlled

8/30

29/118

69/200

7/41

31/186

14/245

buses / total buses
Number of selected
lines / total lines

Once the controllable generator and loads are specified and the number of considered
lines are reduced, the data-driven MPC yields optimal control actions, which are generation ramping ∆G and load shedding ∆D. The data-driven MPC is compared to the
conventional model-based MPC. Specifically, three different conditions are compared to
demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of the developed data-driven MPC: model-
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based MPC with correct, and wrong models, and data-driven MPC with a wrong model.
A wrong model can be caused by errors in the topology processor or incorrect relay status
information.
The control results are illustrated in Figs. 5.7 to 5.9. For the IEEE 30-bus system, controlling the current of line 22 shows that the data-driven MPC can mitigate an overload on
this line and maintain the current within its limit of 0.16 pu in 5 time steps, even with a
wrong system model (the topology processor assumes line 27 is out of service by mistake).
It is also found that the data-driven MPC achieves a comparable mitigation performance
compared to the model-based MPC that uses a correct model. With an inaccurate system model, the model-based MPC fails to find appropriate control actions, as observed
in Fig. 5.7. The control results for both IEEE 118-bus and Illinois 200-bus systems also
demonstrate that the data-driven MPC effectively regulates the line current, even in the
presence of wrong system model information. A model-based MPC with a wrong system
model, may still successfully mitigate overloads (Fig. 5.9). The PTDF matrix of the wrong
system model in Illinois 200-bus system shows that the line with wrong status information
is not electrically close to the regulated line 54. Hence, the PTDF matrix does not change
significantly with the wrong information. This example shows that the performance of
the model-based MPC is dependent on the location of the wrong information, while the
developed data-driven MPC performs well under all circumstances.
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Current (pu)

0.22

Maximum capacity
Data-driven MPC (wrong model)
Model-based MPC (correct model)
Model-based MPC (wrong model)

0.2
0.18
0.16
0.14
1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

6.5

7

Time step (60 s)
Figure 5.7: Performance comparison for mitigating an overload on line 22 in 30-bus system. Line 27 is incorrectly assumed outaged. A time step is 60s.

Current (pu)

0.3

Maximum capacity
Data-driven MPC (wrong model)
Model-based MPC (correct model)
Model-based MPC (wrong model)

0.25
0.2
0.15
1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

6.5

7

Time step (60 s)
Figure 5.8: Mitigating an overload on line 22 in 118-bus system with a wrong system
model, that incorrectly assumes lines 15 and 20 are outaged.

Current (pu)

0.52

Maximum capacity
Data-driven MPC (wrong model)
Model-based MPC (correct model)
Model-based MPC (wrong model)

0.5
0.48
0.46

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

6.5

7

Time step (60 s)
Figure 5.9: Performance comparison of the data-driven MPC in mitigating an overload on
line 54 of the 200-bus system. Line 38 is assumed to be out of service in the wrong model.
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5.6.4

RD-MPC against False Data

A malicious targeted FDIA intentionally tampers the measured data to bypass bad data
detection and misinforms system operators of the real system operating conditions [144].
To improve the resiliency of the data-driven MPC against FDIA attacks, the RD-MPC that
incorporates checkpointing protocol is developed, as explained in section 5.5.4.
Wrongly estimated system states may lead to incorrect control actions that further jeopardize system reliability. The developed RD-MPC is evaluated on the following FDIA
scenario (given in Table 5.1): line 22 of the IEEE 118-bus system is overloaded by 0.05
pu at time instant 5, while the attackers change the measurements to hide the overload.
The results of the RD-MPC and data-driven MPC under attacked data, and the data-driven
MPC with correct data are given in Fig. 5.10. Under FDIA, the obtained control actions
from RD-MPC successfully regulate currents in five time steps, while the data-driven MPC
fails to mitigate the overload on line 22. With state recovery, RD-MPC achieves similar
control performance as the data-driven MPC with correct data.

Current (pu)

0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
1

2

3

4

Maximum capacity
Data-driven MPC (correct data)
Data-driven MPC (wrong data)
RD-MPC (recovered data)
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Time step (60 s)

Figure 5.10: Performance comparison after an overload on line 22 in 118-bus system. A
successful attack hides the overload. Mitigation provided in Table 5.2.
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5.7

Discussion

5.7.1

Robustness to Noise

To evaluate the robustness of the data-driven MPC against noise, its overload mitigation
capability for IEEE 118-bus system, under different signal to noise ratios (SNR) of 60dB,
70dB, 80dB, and 90dB, are compared. Following the same approach taken in [137],
and [138], Gaussian noise is added to the simulated PMU data. The results presented
in Fig. 5.11 show that even with different noise levels, the data-driven MPC can still effectively regulate power flows. The robustness of the data-driven MPC against noise is
due to the introduced regularized squared method in (5.10) that leads to a more sparse α.
Thus, when multiplied by the Hankel matrix, that includes noisy data, the impact of noise
is reduced. Although a recent study in [183] observes that the PMU noise is non-Gaussian,

Current (pu)

the impact of other types of noises can still be minimized by a sparse α vector.
Maximum capacity
90dB
80dB
70dB
60dB

0.24
0.22
0.2
1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

6.5

7

Time step (60 s)
Figure 5.11: Evaluation of the robustness of the data-driven MPC against noisy data in
mitigating the overload on line 22 in 118-bus system. Four different SNR levels are considered.

5.7.2

Computation Time

The computation time of the data-driven MPC for Illinois 200-bus system with different
sparse regulation parameters ρ1 , and line selection parameter γ is compared in Table 5.3.
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With these strategies, the computation time drops to 39.9 s from 71.54 s, given γ = 0.9 and
ρ1 = 1. A slight reduction in γ increases the computation time, due to an increase in the
number of the selected lines. Increasing ρ1 reduces the number of control actions, and thus
slightly decreases the computation time. However, large ρ1 may cause infeasible solutions
for the data-driven MPC. With the described time reduction strategies, the total time for the
data-driven MPC, including solver computation and optimization model construction time,
is 0.9s, 9.7s, and 39s for the IEEE 30-bus, IEEE 118-bus and Illinois 200-bus systems,
respectively. The solver computation times are 0.47s, 0.58s and 0.6s, respectively. The
computation times are less than a minute, while the model construction time is the most
time consuming step. However, the optimization model only needs to be constructed once.
Thus, the data-driven MPC can potentially be used to promptly mitigate thermal overloads.
For a power system with thousands of buses, a decentralized computation approach can
further reduce the time.
Table 5.3: Computation time of the data-driven MPC for Illinois 200-bus system. The
mitigation scenario is given in Table 5.2.

5.7.3

# buses

# lines

Time (s)

0

0

200

245

71.54

0.9

1

69

14

39.9

0.8

1

69

19

40.7

0.9

1.5

60

14

39.6

Limitation and Improvement

Here, the limitations of the developed MPC method are discussed, and possible solutions
are introduced. Line outage attacks, which result in a change in system topology, are not
considered in this chapter. A topology change requires reconstruction of the data-driven
power flow model with new system data after line outages. The time for such model reconstruction will be more than a minute for a large power system, which is not desired
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for the prompt overload mitigation considered. To overcome the aforementioned limitation, two strategies can be taken: (1) increasing the sampling frequency of the PMUs; (2)
utilizing a decentralized MPC method to find the optimal actions. The rational for increasing the sampling frequency is that the required number of PMU data for constructing the
power flow model can be obtained in a shorter time. A decentralized MPC method further improves the computation time, by reducing the dimension of the power flow model.
The decentralized approach divides the system into multiple sub-systems, controlled by a
separate MPC controller [184].
Another limitation is that the developed RD-MPC requires the grid to be fully observable
by PMUs. Loss of observability would result in an inaccurate data-driven power flow
model, and thus cannot correctly mitigate overloads. To ensure the effectiveness of the
RD-MPC method, redundant PMUs should be deployed to guarantee the observability of
the grid, if any PMUs become unavailable.

5.8

Conclusion

This chapter developed an attack-resilient control method (RD-MPC) for mitigation of the
thermal overloads under the threats of targeted FDIA. While conventional MPC control
methods rely on DC power flow model to identify proper mitigative actions, RD-MPC
estimates a data-driven power flow model through measured input-output PMU data, and
thus avoids the adverse impacts of a wrong system model. To address the possibility of
a FDIA on PMU data, a checkpointing protocol is adopted and extended to recover the
actual system states from the past trustworthy data, if the measured data is believed to
be compromised. Two strategies were introduced to accelerate the RD-MPC computation
time, and make it applicable to practical applications. Simulation results on IEEE 30-bus,
IEEE 118-bus, and Illinois 200-bus systems demonstrated that, unlike the conventional
MPC, the RD-MPC can still use the measured data to identify the optimal control actions
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and eliminate the thermal overloads, even in presence of wrong system model or noisy
measurements.
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Chapter 6
Summary and and Future Work

In this chapter, the main contributions of this dissertation, i.e., grid event detection, impact
assessment, and mitigations, are summarized. The future directions of the research are
also discussed here.

6.1

Summary

This dissertation focuses on improving grid reliability with PMUs in three aspects: grid
event detection, impact assessment in both steady and dynamic states, and event mitigation.
In Chapter 2, a new data-driven approach is developed to rapidly and accurately inform
system operators of the types of system events using PMU voltage and current data. The
conventional event classification methodologies cannot distinguish counterfeit events that
are generated by the attackers. However, in the developed event classification approach,
counterfeit events can be labeled as a fake event. Hence, this methodology enables a more
credible knowledge of the system events. To promptly and accurately process large-scale
PMU data and extract event oscillation patterns, an effective data processing method is
developed. Rather than only examining a measurement with the largest variation during
an event, the developed data-driven approach analyzes the multivariate PMU times series
data gathered at local PDC such that the correlation among PMU time series data can be
determined and utilized to identify counterfeit events. Compared to the baseline methods
such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA), wavelet, shapelet and Dshapelet, the devel-
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oped data driven method achieves a higher classification accuracy on both clean and noisy
PMU data. Furthermore, using substation measurements available at each local PDC, this
chapter introduces a scalable approach to event classification, that is independent of the
power system size. Instead of processing all PMU data as a whole, the proposed scalable approach shifts the event classification task from system level to the substation level.
Therefore, the developed methodology can be applied to different power network sizes, a
significant contribution over the state-of-the-art methods.
In Chapter 3, to evaluate the impact of the real system event and promptly predict potential
cascading failures in steady state, a dynamic cascading failure model, that is adaptive to
changing operating conditions, is developed. In this failure model, Bayesian framework is
utilized to estimate power grid component interactions for a specific operating condition,
resulting in more accurate estimation of the interactions for near real-time operations.
Additionally, to predict the propagation of failures and predict the failure probability for
each system component at each point in time, a propagation tree method is developed.
This information can help initiate actions on the components with high failure probability,
e.g. relay blocking, so that the propagation of cascades is prevented. Hence, the operators
could have more time to identify optimal mitigative actions. Additionally, the developed
model can forecast impending failures in a significantly shorter time than the DC/ACbased cascading failure models, and thus is more useful for power system monitoring and
control.
In Chapter 4, the impact assessment of the grid event in transient state is considered. To
accurately predict the transient status after a disturbance, a HGAN-based TSA model is
developed. In this HGAN model, only a single sample of post-contingency PMU voltage data is needed. Hence, TSA can be performed in a relatively short period of time.
Additionally, to retain the spatial and temporal features of the multivariate PMU time series data and improve TSA accuracy, the generative and adversarial networks are designed

141
in a specific manner. In case studies, the ability of the developed model in predicting a
sequence of the transient data is demonstrated. In comparison to the conventional machine learning-based TSA methods that deploy decision trees, SVM, LSTM, or GRU, the
developed model achieves better performance in terms of prediction accuracy and speed.
In Chapter 5, another aspect of enhancing grid reliability, i.e., event mitigation, is presented. To efficiently alleviate thermal overloads under false data injection attack, a datadriven controller, based on MPC approach, is developed. In this data-driven controller, a
new measurement-based power flow is used to replace the approximate model-based DC
power flow. In contrast to parametric data-driven methods that require calculating system
parameters (such as ISF), the developed data-driven method is non-parametric, and thus
avoids the impact of wrong system model information. To make the model robust to the
false data attack, the concept of state recovery is leveraged to ensure the validity of the
measurements used for identifying the proper mitigations Furthermore, to make the control methodology more suitable for online applications, two strategies are developed to
simplify the control action space while retaining feasible solutions.

6.2
6.2.1

Future Research Directions
Cascading Failure Analysis in both Steady and Dynamic States

In Chapter 3, a dynamic cascading failure model is developed to predict the cascade sequence and identify critical system components regarding steady state. Similar to the
state-of-the-art cascading failure models, all these failure models neglect either steady or
transient states to study the sequence of cascades. However, in reality, the propagation
of the cascades is affected by factors in both steady and transient states, e.g., line overloads and unstable transients. To precisely study the cascades, combining both steady and
transient states in analyzing the propagation of cascades is one of our future work.
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6.2.2

Distributed Data-driven MPC for Alleviating Thermal Overloads

In Chapter 5, a centralized data-driven MPC model is developed to alleviate thermal overloads. When an overload occur in power grids, all PMU measurements will be sent to the
control center to help determine proper mitigative actions. As the size of the grid network
increases, the time of identifying appropriate control actions by solving the MPC optimization problem will be significantly increased, and reducing the applicability for online
applications. To address the issue of computation time, splitting the centralized MPC task
into each local agent would dramatically decrease the computational complexity of the
task. Hence, developing a distributed data-driven MPC model is considered as a future
work.

6.2.3

Transient Event Sequence Prediction

In Chapter 4, a HGAN-based TSA approach is developed to accurately and promptly determine the transient status, i.e., stable or unstable, with only one sample of PMU voltage
measurement. In this work, the main objective is to perform a classification task, although
it is shown that the developed HGAN model has the ability to predict the sequence of the
transient. In transient analysis, having the knowledge of the trajectory of transients is more
critical, as the transient stability margin, i.e., the degree of power grid generators to remain
synchronism, can be obtained. Hence, with only one sample of the post-fault PMU data,
it is interesting to further improve the developed HGAN-based TSA model to predict the
transient sequence.
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Nomenclature
∆D

Load shedding vector

∆G

Generation ramping vector

∆P inj(k)

A column vector of active power injection change at time k

∆P inj[0,N −1]

A stacked vector of active power injection change from time 0 to time N

δi

Rotor angle of machine i

γ, ρ1

Regularization parameter for the number of selected lines, and the buses

Ψ

Power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) matrix

A

Edge-to-node incidence matrix

M, Q, SL

Weight matrix of generation ramping, load shedding, and the slack variable S

µ, ρ2

Regularization parameter for the data-driven power flow model

ωi

Rotor speed of machine i

σ

Sigmoid activation function

Bij , Gij

Conductance and susceptance in the ith row and jth column of admittance
matrix Y

D, G

Discriminator and Generator of the GAN model

Di

Damping constant of generator i
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Ei

Internal bus voltage of machine i

ht−1

Output from the previous GRU

ht

Final GRU output

′

ht

The current memory unit of GRU

Mi

Angular momentum of machine i

N MPC , Nd

Length of the MPC prediction horizon and the attack detection horizon

Nini , Nf

Length of the initial and future system input-output, respectively

Pim , Pie

Mechanical and electrical power input of the machine i

P f max

Line power flow limits

P fi, [0,N −1]

A column vector of active power flow of line i from time 0 to time N

P fi (k)

The active power flow of line i at time k

P inj

Power injections at all buses

rt

The reset gate output of GRU

tanh

Hyperbolic tangent activation function

vmax , vmin

Vectors of the maximal and minimal limits of the control actions

xt

Input data to GRU

zt

The update gate output of GRU

ϵ

PMU measurement noise
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ω

Load fluctuation vector

ini, f

Abbreviations for initial and future system input/output
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[90] V. Donde, V. López, B. Lesieutre, A. Pinar, C. Yang, and J. Meza, “Severe multiple
contingency screening in electric power systems,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 406–417, 2008.
[91] S. Eftekharnejad, “Selection of multiple credible contingencies for real time contingency analysis,” in 2015 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting.

IEEE,

2015, pp. 1–5.
[92] I. H. Mads R. Almassalkhi. (2014) Model-predictive cascade mitigation

in

electric

line]. Available:

power

systems

with

storage

and

renewables.

[On-

https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20140624104957-T3B%

20-%201%20-%20Almassalkhi Hiskens Final.pdf
[93] A.-A. Fouad and V. Vittal, Power system transient stability analysis using the transient energy function method.

Pearson Education, 1991.

[94] D. R. Gurusinghe and A. D. Rajapakse, “Post-disturbance transient stability status prediction using synchrophasor measurements,” IEEE Transactions on Power
systems, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 3656–3664, 2015.
[95] T. L. Vu and K. Turitsyn, “Lyapunov functions family approach to transient stability
assessment,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 1269–1277,
2015.

158
[96] M. Pai and P. W. Sauer, “Stability analysis of power systems by Lyapunov’s direct
method,” IEEE Control Systems Magazine, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 23–27, 1989.
[97] E. Farantatos, R. Huang, G. J. Cokkinides, and A. Meliopoulos, “A predictive generator out-of-step protection and transient stability monitoring scheme enabled by a
distributed dynamic state estimator,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 31,
no. 4, pp. 1826–1835, 2015.
[98] Y. Xue, T. Van Custem, and M. Ribbens-Pavella, “Extended equal area criterion
justifications, generalizations, applications,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 44–52, 1989.
[99] M. Z. Jahromi and S. M. Kouhsari, “A novel recursive approach for real-time transient stability assessment based on corrected kinetic energy,” Applied Soft Computing, vol. 48, pp. 660–671, 2016.
[100] M. Pai, Energy function analysis for power system stability.

Springer Science &

Business Media, 2012.
[101] P. Ju, H. Li, C. Gan, Y. Liu, Y. Yu, and Y. Liu, “Analytical assessment for transient
stability under stochastic continuous disturbances,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 2004–2014, 2017.
[102] J. Yan, C.-C. Liu, and U. Vaidya, “PMU-based monitoring of rotor angle dynamics,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 2125–2133, 2011.
[103] M. Li, A. Pal, A. G. Phadke, and J. S. Thorp, “Transient stability prediction based on
apparent impedance trajectory recorded by PMUs,” International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, vol. 54, pp. 498–504, 2014.
[104] R. Diao, V. Vittal, and N. Logic, “Design of a real-time security assessment tool for

159
situational awareness enhancement in modern power systems,” IEEE Transactions
on Power systems, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 957–965, 2009.
[105] T. Amraee and S. Ranjbar, “Transient instability prediction using decision tree technique,” IEEE Transactions on power systems, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 3028–3037, 2013.
[106] B. Wang, B. Fang, Y. Wang, H. Liu, and Y. Liu, “Power system transient stability
assessment based on big data and the core vector machine,” IEEE Transactions on
Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 2561–2570, 2016.
[107] J. Geeganage, U. Annakkage, T. Weekes, and B. A. Archer, “Application of energybased power system features for dynamic security assessment,” IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 1957–1965, 2014.
[108] Y. Xu, Z. Y. Dong, J. H. Zhao, P. Zhang, and K. P. Wong, “A reliable intelligent
system for real-time dynamic security assessment of power systems,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 1253–1263, 2012.
[109] Y. Li and Z. Yang, “Application of EOS-ELM with binary Jaya-based feature selection to real-time transient stability assessment using PMU data,” IEEE Access,
vol. 5, pp. 23 092–23 101, 2017.
[110] S. K. Azman, Y. J. Isbeih, M. S. El Moursi, and K. Elbassioni, “A unified online
deep learning prediction model for small signal and transient stability,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 4585–4598, 2020.
[111] L. Zhu, D. J. Hill, and C. Lu, “Hierarchical deep learning machine for power system
online transient stability prediction,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 35,
no. 3, pp. 2399–2411, 2019.
[112] J. James, D. J. Hill, A. Y. Lam, J. Gu, and V. O. Li, “Intelligent time-adaptive tran-

160
sient stability assessment system,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 33,
no. 1, pp. 1049–1058, 2017.
[113] Z. Li, H. Liu, J. Zhao, T. Bi, and Q. Yang, “Fast power system event identification
using enhanced lstm network with renewable energy integration,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2021.
[114] F. Pan, J. Li, B. Tan, C. Zeng, X. Jiang, L. Liu, and J. Yang, “Stacked-GRU based
power system transient stability assessment method,” Algorithms, vol. 11, no. 8, p.
121, 2018.
[115] Q. Zhu, J. Chen, L. Zhu, D. Shi, X. Bai, X. Duan, and Y. Liu, “A deep end-to-end
model for transient stability assessment with PMU data,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp.
65 474–65 487, 2018.
[116] D. You, K. Wang, L. Ye, J. Wu, and R. Huang, “Transient stability assessment of
power system using support vector machine with generator combinatorial trajectories inputs,” International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, vol. 44,
no. 1, pp. 318–325, 2013.
[117] F. Da-Zhong, T. Chung, and A. David, “Fast transient stability estimation using a
novel dynamic equivalent reduction technique,” IEEE transactions on power systems, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 995–1001, 1994.
[118] M. Pavella, D. Ernst, and D. Ruiz-Vega, Transient stability of power systems: a
unified approach to assessment and control. Springer Science & Business Media,
2012.
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